Titel: Distributive Justice in the Lab: Testing the Binding Role of Agreement
Autor: Laura Marcon, Pedro Francés-Gómez, and Marco Faillo
Lorenzo Sacconi and his coauthors have put forward the hypothesis that impartial agreements on distributive rules may generate a conditional preference for conformity. The observable effect of this preference would be compliance with fair distributive rules chosen behind a veil of ignorance, even in the absence of external coercion. This paper uses a Dictator Game with production and taking option to compare two ways in which the device of the veil of ignorance may be thought to generate a motivation for, and compliance with a fair distributive rule: individually—as a thought experiment that should work as a moral cue—and collectively—as an actual process of agreement among subjects. The main result is that actual agreement proves to be necessary for agents to be led towards a fair distributive principle and to generate a significant amount of compliance in absence of external authority. This conclusion vindicates the role of actual agreements in generating motivational power in correspondence with fair distributive rules.
Focus: Experiments on Social Norms
2020 (42) Heft 1
According to the classics of social theory—Durkheim, Weber, Parsons—social order cannot be based on individual utility seeking and external power, but requires ‘normative integration’. Even for large parts of the social sciences today it seems to be almost self-evident that social norms are the very ‘cement of society’ (Elster). The underlying assumption is that essential building blocks of social order in the form of individual cooperation, collective action and political governance...