Analyse & Kritik

Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory


"Harold Morick"

Titel: Comment on Ausonio Marras: Intentionality and Physicalism: a Resolvable Dispute (ANALYSE & KRITIK 1/80)
Autor: Harold Morick
Seite: 190-193

Abstract: Contrary to Marras: (1) the third of Chisholm's Intentional criteria of sentences about mental states and events succeeds in highlighting an intuitive feature of Intentionality. (2) If there ist such a thing as modality, it resides either in the way we speak of things or in the things, regardless of the way we speak of them. If the latter, modal sentences fail to satisfy Chisholm's criterion for mentalistic sentences; and if the former, modal sentences turn out to be mentalistic sentences. So either way - if either the latter or the former - modal sentences fail to provide a counterexample to Chisholm's claim that his criterion picks out only mentalistic sentences. (3) Functionalisrn doesn,t enable physicalism to accomodate Intentional states and events, because functionalismrejects a traditional tenet of physicalism.

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