Analyse & Kritik

Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory


"Ernst Tugendhat"

Titel: Die Kontroverse um die Menschenrechte
Autor: Ernst Tugendhat
Seite: 101-110

Abstract: It is assumed a) that the statement that a human right exists means that a state which does not grant it is not legitimate, and b) that the legitimacy of power can, in modern times, be justified only by showing that it is in the equal interest of everybody. Mere democracy is insufficient to legitimate political power. Freedom for every individual must be guaranteed. So much is common ground in the controversy on human rights, but to interpret these freedom as a negative freedom, as the classical conception of human rights has done, is insufficient and therefore illegitimate, because it is not in the equal interest of everybody. To add a positive concept of freedom is correct but not enough, because it still neglects those who even if they are given the facilities do not have the capacity. Since the handicapped, the old and the young cannot even enter a contract and the disposessed cannot enter a fair contract, the contractarian foundation ofhuman rights must be discarded.

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Titel: Kritische Anmerkungen zu Ernst Tugendhats Konzept der Legitimität
Autor: Norbert Hoerster
Seite: 111-114

Abstract: According to Tugendhat's moral theory of legitimation the equal consideration of the interests of all is required. Tugendhat claims that this concept is the only one remaining as traditional forms of justification are no longer available. The author argues that Tugendhat's theory must fail because he tries to realize two contradictory aims: on the one hand that his principle of legitimation should not to be reduced to individual interests; on the other hand that it should be reached without any aprioristic presuppositions.

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Titel: Ernst Tugendhat über Menschenrechte - Kontroverse Bemerkungen
Autor: Peter Koller
Seite: 115-119

Abstract: In this critical comment on Ernst Tugendhat's paper I dispute his view in two respects: the first refers to the concept, the second to the justification of human rights. As far as the concept of human rights is concerned, I argue that Tugendhat fails to notice that there are different kinds of human rights which are to be distinguished carefully. This conceptual failure prevents him from seeing that different human rights are justified by different reasons. While universal human rights can be justified by the principle of universalization, community rights are based on the demands of social justice.

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Titel: Comments on some Methodological Aspects of Rawls, "Theory of Justice"
Autor: Ernst Tugendhat
Seite: 77-89

Abstract: In the first part of the paper Rawls, conception of a "reflective equilibrium" with our "considered moral judgements" is criticized. Moral judgements cannot form a court of appeal for the justification of moral principles, since they are themselves in need of justification. An analysis of the meaning of the sentences in which moral judgements are expressed is called for in order to establish their method of justification. In the second part of the paper the consequence which Rawls, repudiation of semantic analysis has had for his conception of the "original position" is discussed. In retrogressive extension of his four-stage-sequence a zero-stage is postulated which represents the moral point of view. At this stage the reasons would have to be given for adopting the original position and for conceiving it with just those characteristics that Rawls has assumed. Only thus can the advantages and disadvantages of these characteristics be analytically assessed.

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