

Diskussion/Discussion

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Replies to the Critics of *A Theory of Social Action**

Abstract: The paper is a reply to the critical reviews of the author's *A Theory of Social Action* by Anton Leist, Marvin Belzer, and Julian Nida-Rümelin in this journal. As to Leist's main criticisms, which concern the notions of social action, social practical reasoning, individualism, and social norms, they are argued to be incorrect and unjustified. Belzer's criticisms are on the whole well taken, and in fact all of them have been noted by the author in his later work. Belzer does not, however, consider these newest analyses and improvements. Nida-Rümelin presents some comments on the relationships between collective preferences and we-intentions. These points are correct.

1. Introductory Remarks

First I wish to thank my critics Anton Leist, Marvin Belzer, and Julian Nida-Rümelin for taking the trouble of not only reading my long - too long - book *A Theory of Social Action* (1984, 'ATSA' for short) but also for thinking up lots of criticisms against it. I also wish to thank *Analyse & Kritik* for the chance to respond to my critics. While my reply will mostly consist in more or less detailed comments on my critics remarks I will start by some general comments pertinent to the whole matter.

I finished the first version of the book in 1981. Although I did polish the manuscript a little more before it came out, I was mainly working in a different field during 1982-1984. In 1985 I came back to a key issue in the book, viz. the problem of giving a viable analysis of we-intentions, and I am still on this trip at the time of writing this reply. Together with my co-worker Kaarlo Miller I noticed some problems, difficulties and lacunae, with my analysis given in the book. We wrote a short paper *We-intentions and Social Action* (Tuomela/Miller 1985) where we commented on some of the lacunae in the book but kept the analysis of we-intentions basically intact. Let me reproduce that analysis here, with X ranging over joint action types (cf. ATSA, 35):

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(WI¹) A member A_i of a collective G we-intends to do X if and only if

(i) A_i intends to do his part of X, given that (he believes that) every (full-fledged and adequately informed member) of G or at least that a sufficient number of them, as required for the performance of X, will (or at least probably will) do his part (their parts) of X;

(ii) A_i believes that every (full-fledged and adequately informed) member of G or at least that a sufficient number of them, as required for the performance of X, will (or at least probably will) do his part (their parts) of X;

(iii) there is a mutual belief in G to the effect that (i) and (ii).

Later on it appeared that some revisions were called for. Our newest attempt appears in a forthcoming paper entitled Group Intentions. The most important new change there is perhaps to make a clear distinction between the presuppositions of intentions and the conditions of conditional intentions. In the above analysis of we-intention the word "given" in clause (i) ambiguously covers both conditions and presuppositions. Once the distinction is made clear it can be seen that there are unconditional we-intentions at least in the sense of we-intentions analyzable with unconditional mere intentions in clause i). The previous 'condition' appearing above in clause i) is now regarded as a presupposition only. So we get the following analysis:

(WI²) A member A_i of a collective G we-intends to do X if and only if

(i) A_i intends to do his part of X;

(ii) A_i has a belief to the effect that the conceptual joint action opportunities for X obtain, especially that at least a sufficient number of the full-fledged and adequately informed members of G, as required for the performance of X, will (or at least probably will) do their parts of X;

(iii) A_i believes that there is a mutual belief among the participating members of G to the effect that the conceptual joint action opportunities for X obtain.

While I shall not here go deeper into the matter, let me still point out a couple of things about the latest analysis (WI²). First, its second clause has the status of a conceptual presupposition underlying the intention-

ascription. Secondly, we can now deal with properly conditional we-intentions and analyze them by adding conditions to the intentions in clause (i) and by possibly complicating the matters in other ways, too. Thirdly, various other refinements are introduced in our newest attempt. Thus, the requirement of mutual belief is weakened to replicative social loop beliefs (roughly in the sense of David Lewis). Our argument for them is most centrally based on the three assumptions that dealing with the cases of two agents A and B, for simplicity - A intends to do his part, believes that B will do his, and also believes that he cannot do his own part only by himself. Then we arrive at the iterable loop belief "A believes that B believes that A will do his part of X".

It is hard to do work in a new field like the theory of many-person action and, more generally, social action, if one expects the details of one's analyses to last for years and decades. I can only wish belatedly that I would have had the opportunity to benefit from criticisms such as the present ones before the publication of the book.

2. Reply to Leist

(1) Anton Leist's review-article (Leist 1985) of my book would require perhaps an equally long response, if I really wanted - and had the opportunity - to comment on all the points of disagreement between us. But I will have to compromise. My comments below will mainly fall into two groups: 1) corrections of obvious misunderstandings and distortions of my views, and 2) answers to Leist's criticisms of some central topics or arguments in my book. It is an unfortunate feature about his review that class 1) has become unnecessarily large. (One special but annoying problem is that Leist has chosen to present only grossly simplified and in some cases clearly incorrect and distorted versions of my analyses of key notions; some of the worst distortions will be corrected below.) I would have strongly preferred to concentrate on interesting counterarguments against my views rather than to spend pages on corrections of simple misunderstandings. But I suppose my duty here is to try to set the record straight, at least as far as I am concerned.

One of the most central ideas of my book is to use 'we-attitudes', especially we-intentions and mutual beliefs, to build a conceptual account of actions involving several actors, especially actions jointly performed by several agents. (We may call many-person actions social in a 'narrow' or 'strict' sense.) This is done in rather great detail in the main part of the book. Those developments rely in part on my previous work on single-agent actions and in part on a kind of conceptual individualism. (Contrary to what Leist at least seems to think, strong rationality claims are avoided throughout the book.) As a kind of by-product of the main theory several

other related issues, such as conceptual problems related to social norms, social control, explanation of social action, receive rather natural treatments.

Leist sums up his critical review as follows: "Tuomela's most original idea in the analysis of joint action, that of we-intentions, is not broad enough to cover more than a part of social action in the commonly understood sense. His 'social' practical reasoning incorporates an implausible premiss. The game-theoretical reconstruction of social norms strikes one as unlikely to be fulfilled in social reality. Hardly any of these analyses back up the individualist claims of Tuomela's project." (Leist 1985, 180) I shall below present arguments to the effect that all of the above four statements by Leist are incorrect and unjustified.

Leist's criticisms fall into four groups having to do with 1) social action, 2) social practical reasoning, 3) individualism, and 4) social norms. I will below comment on these topics in this same order, thus starting with 1).

(2) Leist discusses the notion of social action in his Section 2. There he - without presenting arguments - is strongly attached to the idea that Weber's old notion of social action is somehow the most central notion of social action and tries to argue against the appropriateness of some of my notions. I do indeed regard Weber's concept as interesting and important, but I think at the same time that we should not seek for the notion of social action in some kind of essentialistic fashion. Anyway, Leist is here mistaken on several counts. First, he apparently has not read through the book nor has he even looked up the 49 (!) different notions referred to in the index by the phrase "social action", or else he could hardly have restricted his discussion to only three of the action concepts that I have analyzed (viz. those defined by (5.5), (5.10), or its equivalent (PCS), and (9.1) of ATSA).

To proceed to a brief discussion, let us start with Weber. According to him an action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course. Now surely this definition - which undoubtedly would benefit from elucidation - captures an interesting sense of social action. Indeed, it can be regarded as closely related to my notion of a widely understood social action (ATSA, 1). Furthermore, it can be at least partially elucidated by some of my intentional notions defined in Chapter 9 of ATSA. (See e.g. its note 6) where I in fact explicitly propose (9.57) as such an explication, which Leist does not even refer to.) Anyway, my primary concern in ATSA has been the elucidation of joint social action and not individual social action. Leist somehow would have liked me to analyze individual social actions more closely. While that would be a worthwhile project and while parts of

Chapter 9 of ATSA are concerned with it, it is still clearly peripheral to the main project of the book. (Leist even goes so far, on p. 190, as to claim that according to my account an individual acting alone can never act socially. But I never said anything like that.)

Leist tries to argue that my analysis of social action is inadequate, and does it in the following way. He picks out my analysis of intentionally performed social action (PCS) - of which he incorrectly claims on p. 184 that it gives my most general notion of social action - and claims that it is too narrow, relative to Weber's notion. Next he picks my broadest, non-intentional notion (9.1) and claims that it is too wide. Well, the truth of the matter is that neither of these notions is meant to explicate Weber's notion. (Rather my - perhaps partial - explication of his notion is given by (9.57), cf. above.) I could of course equally well by Leist's method of argumentation show many silly things, for instance that Weber's notion of social action is not adequate for characterizing intentionally performed joint action, viz. my key notion (PCS).

Leist also seems to dislike my most general notion of joint action as defined by (5.5) of ATSA. I have not, however, been able to find a proper critical argument to which I could respond. So I shall not discuss the matter further in this context, to save space. So, in all, Leist has not succeeded in presenting interesting criticisms of my elucidations. Especially he has not succeeded in showing that we-intentions are not broad enough to cover what plausibly can be understood by (full blown) intentional joint actions. Much of his discussion seems to boil down to the uninteresting verbal issue of what to take the word "social" to cover - rather than being concerned with the conceptually interesting features of the various types of 'sociality' that it can be taken to cover.

(3) Let us then proceed to Leist's discussion of social practical reasoning in Section 3. of his paper. The unfortunate thing about the whole section is that it does not even get off the ground, for the whole argument is based on a slip on Leist's part! For the rather incredible matter of fact is that in his translation of my schema (PR_1) from p. 346 of ATSA Leist translates both "move" (premiss 1)) and "carry" (conclusion C_1) by "schieben". But the whole point of that schema relies on the fact that moving is a more general notion than that of carrying - otherwise no intention-transference could take place! While this is not the only error in Leist's discussion it is course grave enough to make his Section 3. almost or wholly worthless.

(4) Leist's discussion of individualism in his Section 4. is actually the only part of his review which does not miss its target by miles. But even here he gets carried away and goes on to present some alleged improvements of my theses, and I do not really find them interesting enough to comment

on. Anyway, what I am doing with (conceptual) individualism in the book is this. I have presented a programmatic thesis (CI) of conceptual individualism, meant to be a principle for construing and forming social concepts (ATSA, 27). Thesis (CI) says the following, given a 'constitutive' social theory T (which ideally will be an ultimate, best-explaining theory) which has S as its set of social, including holistic, predicates and I as its set of individualistic or individualistically acceptable predicates: The meanings of the social predicates in S depend entirely upon their usage with the predicates in I, assumed antecedently understood, within the meaning-specifying theory T.

I will be happy to grant that (CI) would profit from a more detailed analysis of how to effect a dichotomy between social and individualistic predicates and of how to characterize in detail what the 'dependence of usage' of predicates involves. (I have later tried to analyze this dependence in terms of a kind of supervenience relation.) It should be noticed that (CI) is very programmatic as it makes the division of predicates into individualistic and holistic ones ultimately to hang on the development of science. Therefore I did not even try in ATSA to say very much about the matter and therefore also Leist's a priori speculations of how to do that do not seem too well taken (and hence also my (CI) is to be preferred to Leist's theory-independent (CI*)). Let me, however, say that I tend to agree with his remarks on p. 193 - see my similar remarks on p. 477 of ATSA, which Leist does not seem to have noticed. (Specifically I agree that (CI) should be taken to be about elementary individualistic predicates.) His clause 2') of his (CI*) on p. 194 seems acceptable - as far as it goes. His (CI**) again seems too strict, for the analysis of holistic social notions may have to involve also other predicates than merely the individualistic theoretical predicates Leist suggests.

Leist seems to consider on p. 195 that my analysis of we-intentions in terms of (WI) is not individualistically acceptable because the analysis contains the notion of a collective and because - or so I construe Leist - collectives resist my purported kind of individualistic analysis. But Leist offers no argument for the latter claim. To be sure, I do not claim to have a fully satisfactory individualistic analysis of the notion of collective to offer, but at least I sketch on p. 266 of ATSA how to proceed. (The kind of social interaction I am referring to in that context can be understood as being of some suitably general type; cf. (9.3) as a possible candidate here.) In view of notes 9) and 11) of Leist's paper it seems that he does not too well understand what I am up to here. Let me just say here that my notion of collective is a broad notion covering e.g. groups, organizations and communities. The notion of group is individualistically, analyzed by (8.20) of ATSA. Organizations are basically built out of

groups, and communities out of organizations and institutions (see ATSA, 266).

My conclusion concerning Leist's discussion of my individualistic programme of concept formation is that he has not succeeded in formulating effective arguments against it.

(5) Leist's fourth topic concerns my brief analysis of social norms. As his formulation of my analysis is seriously wrong I will start by stating it correctly. The analysis is concerned with giving truth conditions for rule statements such as "Everybody ought to do X when in C", call it N, and for analogous, more complicated ones relative to a community S. These truth conditions are supposed to tell which rules qualify as social norms and which don't. When the truth conditions obtain, then that rule can also be said to 'exist' as a social norm in S. But giving such truth conditions also defines the concept of a social norm relative to an understanding of rules in the sense of ought- and may-sentences (but not relative to the concept of social rule). This remark should suffice to take care of Leist's relevant critical remarks on pp. 198-199.

My analysis of social norms goes as follows (ATSA, 242):

(8.1) Rule N is a social norm in S if and only if

- (a) the members of S, when in situation C (and believing so) are disposed to reason in ways justifiable by the schema (SA_i) or a similar schema that they ought to do X in C;
- (b) most (or at least many) members of S do X in C and some of them at least sometimes because of their so reasoning that they ought to do X in C;
- (c) there is in S some (socially accepted) pressure, typically due to sanctions, against deviating from doing X in C;
- (d) the members of S have a mutual belief to the effect that (a), (b), and (c).

As the reader can verify, clauses a) - c) of my above formulation differ from Leist's version. Especially grave is his distortion of clause (a), for his rendering of it says that the members of S, when in C or when they believe that they are in C, will justify, in accordance with (SA_i), that they ought to do X in C. There are several differences between his and my version. To point out the most serious one, according to my formulation the members of S, when in C and believing so, are disposed to reason that they ought to do X in C. They are not required to justify this in any

way contrary to Leist's excessively strong formulation; and this grave error by my critic makes most of his discussion concerning (a) irrelevant to my account. (Furthermore, as I emphasize on p. 243 of ATSA, the justifying inferences in question need not always be too similar to (SA_i) .)

Another criticism against (a) by Leist is that it does not allow for obeying 'unpleasant' norms, as somehow the schema (SA_i) only is concerned with pleasant utilities (utilities concerned with pleasant intrinsic desires). But this is incorrect. As characterized in Chapter 2 of ATSA, my notion of utility is based on both intrinsic and extrinsic wants (proattitudes). As extrinsic wants can include unpleasant proattitudes, Leist's criticism is invalid.

My above remarks should in fact suffice to rebut all the arguments that Leist has presented against my analysis of social norms. (Leist is also dissatisfied with various other features of my analysis - without, however, presenting any arguments. To this I can only say that I am satisfied with them on the grounds given in ATSA.) Leist also claims that my analysis is not individualistic in the sense of my programme of concept formation, because the notion of a community is employed in it. But that would be a valid criticism only if no such analysis can be given. However, as said, I have sketched a programmatic individualistic analysis of the notion of community on p. 266 of ATSA. But I don't claim to have all the details available presently.

Finally, I wish to thank Leist for a criticism representing the perspective of a social holist. As the above reply shows my long book is somewhat hard to read, and therefore it is perhaps understandable if a critic does not have the time and energy to dig out what and how I really have argued. In any case Leist has taken up interesting issues which would have deserved a more thorough airing than has been possible here.

3. Reply to Belzer

Belzer concentrates on we-intentions in his review (Belzer 1986). It is unfortunate that he did not have the chance to revise his paper in view of the developments in my mentioned papers We-Intentions and Social Action and Group Intentions (written jointly with Kaarlo Miller), because practically all of Belzer's criticisms were taken up and dealt with in those papers. But things being as they are I cannot but briefly go through Belzer's criticisms below. Before going into details I would like to say that I enjoyed the intellectually high level of his comments. He has the admirable capacity to go right to the kernel of problems with sharp and

generally good arguments. Below I shall go through Belzer's main criticisms and present brief responses to them.

(1) To begin, Belzer starts his commentary by considering the notions of acting intentionally, acting with an intention, and intending to act. He correctly notices that in my account of both individual action and multi-agent action I make the third notion the key notion, viz. mere personal intention to act in the single-agent case and we-intention in the multi-agent case. The other two notions are characterized with the help of the third notion. Belzer seems to have some doubts about this programme. But as he does not present any concrete criticisms there is not really anything for me to respond to on this occasion.

(2) On pp. 88 - 89 of his article Belzer discusses problems related to the deconditionalization of we-intentions, where we-intentions are understood in the sense of our above (WI^I). Let me make two quick points. First, deconditionalization here concerns rather simple cases, which do not in my opinion require strong rationality, contrary to Belzer's claim. Secondly, as I do not any more take standard we-intentions to be conditional in the original sense, Belzer's criticism has no force against my improved new account (see Group Intentions) but I acknowledge that the issue raised by Belzer was not dealt with properly in ATSA.

(3) As to the social character of we-intentions, they involve social presuppositions (ones relating them to the other agents) and social beliefs (beliefs about others) and mutual beliefs. For an individualist - who is not in an uncritical ontological or semantical slumber - there is hardly much more to be desired as to 'sociality'. The sociality of we-intentions is basically to be seen from the analyses of WI in the sense just specified. (My speaking of the 'we-mode' is just informal jargon which in itself explains nothing, nor is meant to.)

One important distinguishing linguistic feature can, however, be pointed out: When I we-intend, expressions of the form "We shall do X", X referring to a joint action, are true of me, whereas in the case of mere personal intending only expressions of the form "I shall do Y" but not the mentioned social ones are true of me. In ATSA I did not try to clarify the logical form of the content of we-intentions nor their ontic status, but operated on a 'surface level' so to speak, having become rather sceptical about contents, essences and the like. On the surface level and prior to deeper theorizing I could accept something like Castanedan locutions and say that "We to do X" represent the contents of we-intentions while "I to do Y" represent those of mere I-intentions. If this kind of account of content were acceptable in some deeper sense - about which I don't have much to say presently - we would have a distinction and a criterion of 'sociality' on the level of content, as Belzer wants it. As long as the tentative

nature of this is kept in mind and as long as no ontological conclusions are drawn from it, it is all right as far as I am concerned. (Notice, by the way that while my (WI^1) and (WI^2) are individualistic, they are not quite as individualistic as Belzer thinks (p.88 of the article). Thus both joint actions and groups are referred to in the analyses, and this perhaps makes it more plausible to maintain a deeper distinction between we-intentions and mere personal intentions than Belzer thinks my analysis allows (although ultimately I give some sort of individualistic underpinning for all prima facie holistic notions).

(4) On p. 90 Belzer criticizes my account of an Olympic 10K race. I do not quite see Belzer's difficulties. Consider, for instance, Lasse Viren. He certainly intended to play by the rules of the game and in that sense run successfully and he very probably also intended to run successfully also in the stronger sense of placing well (this latter claim perhaps was not true of all the participants). I see no problems in making clauses i) - iii) of (WI^2) true here. However, I did not take this example up because of this feature, which is only of marginal interest to a sports fan. Rather I considered the example because of the Ethiopians, who acted as a group and were performing a joint action in a sense thrilling also a sports fan - for such solidarity is not commonly seen in competitive individual sports games at the Olympic level.

(5) On p. 90-91 and in footnote 3 of his article Belzer is simply mistaken in his claim. In the referred places I am speaking of cases of joint action where all the participants have the we-intention in question. With this extra premiss we get the result that there is mutual belief concerning every participant. (Maybe I could have formulated my claims more explicitly?)

(6) On p. 91 Belzer raises a trouble for the strong mutual belief requirement. I agree that if we require that the other participants in fact must have beliefs concerning A_1 about what clauses i) and ii) of (WI^1) and (WI^2) express we are dealing with a highly social and technical notion of we-intention. But in the context of intentional joint action where everyone has the we-intention (and thus the beliefs towards others) things are as they should. But in my newest account I do not require mutual belief in that strongest sense but only in the sense of replicable social loop beliefs originating from A_1 . And to this idea Belzer probably has no objections, I surmise.

(7) On pp. 91 Belzer criticizes my requirement of sufficiency in clauses i) and ii) of (WI^1) , but this criticism is based on a misunderstanding, I think. For I say that if a table requires three carriers then two is sufficiently many for me indeed to take part in the joint carrying. Otherwise, if fewer are taking part, I am not motivated in the sense my action-

prompting notion of intention requires. (Note too that it is not enough that the others merely intend to do their parts, for I may know - contrary to them - that they will not be able to carry out their intentions.)

(8) The final criticism Belzer takes up on pages 91-93 concerns the problem whether my notion of we-intention really is able to capture shared common goals. The criticism is basically that, e.g., the intention-expression "We shall do X" applies to the analysandum but not to the analysans of (WI¹). I don't accept the criticism but I admit I should have said more about the involved problems in ATSA. Recently I have tried to argue for my case in both of my mentioned joint papers We-Intention and Social Action and Group Intention. The basic idea in my account is to understand the locution "his part of X" in clause i) of (WI²) in a strongly intensional sense describable by saying that the agent does whatever he does in that context as his part of X. And if he in this context intends to do something X_i as his part of X it is required that X_i is his part of X and that he believes so and that he intends to do X_i. On the basis of this we can impose the following requirement on the analysans of (WI²): If A_i intends to do X_i as his part of X then he intends that X be realized. And if this principle is accepted Belzer's counterexamples don't go through.

(9) At the end of his paper Belzer makes a proposal of his own for characterizing we-intentions. I read his analysis on p. 93 so that it makes individual intentions expressed by "We shall do X" primary (instead of taking the group's having an intention as primary). As a consequence we face the task of analyzing the somewhat unclear expression "We shall do X". But isn't my (WI²) doing just that? Note, too, that if one then goes on to define we-intentions in terms of the group's intention - as Belzer does - one is dealing with a broader we-intention than my motivational, action-prompting notion. (In my joint paper Group Intentions the discussion of the notion of being in reserve relates to that.)

4. Reply to Nida-Rümelin

In his paper (Nida-Rümelin 1986) Nida-Rümelin discusses the so-called logic of collective decision (or choice) and comments on its relationships to my account of we-intentions. The paper is a clear and informative survey-type discussion of (some relevant features of) the state of the decision-theoretic approach. As, however, the relevance of that discussion to my book is not very close and as also Nida-Rümelin's attempt to make the connection to my account of we-intention is very sketchy, it suffices for me to be very brief in my reply.

As many critics of the decision-theoretic approach (including myself in ATSA) have argued, its conceptual framework is too poor and its underly-

ing rationality assumptions are too strict, and this goes not only for the descriptive applications of the theory but also for its normative applications (cf. 'ought implies can')). While this is not the place for another discussion of the shortcomings of that approach, let me here only comment on the relationship between (collective and individual) preferences and we-intentions.

Nida-Rümelin is particularly interested in analyzing collective preferences, viz. the preferences attributed to collectives. I find his discussion acceptable on the whole. He ends his analysis with giving, in his (DI), a sufficient condition for a group's having a specific preference, and as long as his condition is not taken as a necessary one as well, I can agree. At this point it should be emphasised that I have not in ATSA really tried to analyze the corresponding matter in the case of we-intentions, while I have suggested that all members' having the we-intention is at least sufficient for the group's having it. But my main concern there, in the context of my discussion of we-intentions, was to analyze we-intentions attributed to single members of a group.

Nida-Rümelin claims that there are no conceptual connections between his (DI) and (DII), where the latter gives my analysis in ATSA of a we-intention shared by an individual. This seems correct at least in the sense that one cannot somehow conceptually generate a group's we-intention from its preferences (or at least one cannot generate its members we-intentions from their relevant preferences), for on the whole intentions are not conceptually analyzable in terms of notions such as preferences, wants and beliefs, or so it can be argued at any rate. At the very end of his paper Nida-Rümelin points out that there may be both empirical and normative connections between collective preferences and we-intentions attributed to groups. I agree with him here. I have also myself made the point about the putative empirical connections (e.g. in the case of the Prisoner's Dilemma situations) in ATSA and later works. Nida-Rümelin's point about normative connections derivable from a practical syllogism is interesting and might warrant further study.

Let me finally point out that there is yet another kind of conceptual connection between we-intentions and underlying preferences that I discuss on pp. 423-425 of ATSA. Very roughly speaking, my account of an agent's intention to do Y conceptually requires that he has a proattitude (viz. an intrinsic or extrinsic want) towards Y and that this reveals that his preference towards Y is stronger than towards any other alternative. In the case of we-intentions we must add another requirement, for, assuming the performance of X to be the content of the we-intention here and Y to be the agent's part of X, we must also require that, when we-intending to do X, he also purports, and thus intentionally strongly prefers, X to be

realized while plainly intending to do Y (and strongly preferring it among the alternatives). (Cf. Tuomela/Miller 1985; in press.)

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