Analyse & Kritik

Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory

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"Raimo Tuomela"

Titel: Cooperation as Joint Action
Autor: Raimo Tuomela
Seite: 65-86

Abstract: The paper studies cooperation as joint action, where joint action can, first, be conceptualized either individualistically in terms of the participants' individual goals and beliefs that the joint action is taken to serve. This is individualistic or 'I-mode' cooperation. Special version of it is 'pro-group I-mode' cooperation, where the goals are shared. Second, cooperation can be of the kind where a group of persons act together as a group in terms of the non-aggregative 'we' that they form. The results of the paper support the conjecture that we-mode conceptualization and an account of cooperation is needed to complement the individualistic (pro-group) I-mode account(s) in social science theorizing and experimentation.

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Titel: Comment on Raimo Tuomela: Joint Action: How Rational? How Irreducible?
Autor: Cedric Paternotte
Seite: 87-92

Abstract: In his 'Cooperation as joint action', Tuomela presents a we-mode account of cooperation, which he argues has several advantages over an individual account. This commentary examines to what extent this is true. In particular, I assess three related characteristics of we-mode joint action: its possible rationality, its greater efficiency, and its alleged irreducibility to purely individual properties, which are recurring points of the article.

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Titel: Kommunikatives Handeln und kooperative Ziele
Autor: Raimo Tuomela
Seite: 153-172

Abstract: In this paper an account of communicative action is given from the point of view of communication as a cooperative enterprise. It is argued that there is communication both on the basis of shared collective goals and without them. It is also claimed that people can communicate without specifically formed illocutionary communicative intentions. Finally, the paper compares the account given in the article with Habermas, theory of communicative action.

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Titel: Corporate Action: A Reply to Coleman
Autor: Raimo Tuomela
Seite: 216-218

Abstract: This short note argues that the basic points Coleman (l993) makes against my critical paper (l993) are incorrect. These points concern the possibility of a single agent holding a corporate goal, the doxastic conditions concerning group action, and 'jointness-effects'.

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Titel: Corporate Intention and Corporate Action
Autor: Raimo Tuomela
Seite: 11-21

Abstract: This paper comments on Coleman's account of group action (or corporate action, in his terminology), and his view is compared with the present author's largely complementary view (e. g. Tuomela 1993). Some criticisms concerning Coleman's linear system of action are presented. One of the main points made is that a viable theory of social action must make use of a notion of joint intention and that Coleman's theory is deficient on this score.

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Titel: Reply to Blau, Tuomela, Diekmann and Baurmann
Autor: James S. Coleman
Seite: 62-69

Abstract: This reply responds to four authors in this issue of ANALYSE & KRITIK. I find disagreements with Peter Blau being of a lesser degree than he sees them, though I emphasize the micro-macro relation through which actions combine to produce systemic outcomes, while he emphasizes the effect of social structure upon individuals. Raimo Tuomela exposites a concept of group action which has some differences from my concept of corporate action, but many similarities. Andreas Diekmann examines in detail the problems of collective action toward provision of a public good. From Foundations he makes use of the concept of social capital, showing how with further development it might prove analytically useful; I encourage this direction of work. Michael Baurmann wants to lay a foundation of norms in place of the rights foundation which I develop. While I reject this shift, I largely accept his critique of my position regarding normative theory.

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Titel: What Does Doing One's Part of a Joint Action Involve?
Autor: Raimo Tuomela
Seite: 197-207

Abstract: The paper gives a conceptual clarification of what the notion of apart of a joint action (project, etc.) involves. The - mutually re-cognized - division of a joint action into parts can be based on social norms (viz. formal or informal rules, or proper social norms such as conventions or group specific social norms) or it can be based on agreement, coercion, or some analogous social mechanism. The paper also discusses the notions of a we-intention, of the intention to perform an action as one's part of a joint action, and of an agent's intentionally performing an action as his part of a joint action.

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Titel: Replies to the Critics of A Theory of Social Action
Autor: Raimo Tuomela
Seite: 229-241

Abstract: The paper is a reply to the critical reviews of the author's "A Theory of Social Action" by Anton Leist, Marvin Belzer, and Julian Nida-Rümelin in this journal. As to Leist's main criticisms, which concern the notions of social action, social practical reasoning, individualism, and social norms, they are argued to be incorrect and unjustified. Belzer's criticisms are on the whole well taken, and in fact all of them have been noted by the author in his later work. Belzer does not, however, consider these newest analyses and improvements. Nida-Rümelin presents some comments on the relationships between collective preferences and weintentions. These points are correct.

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Titel: Eine individualistische Theorie sozialen Handelns. Zu Raimo Tuomelas "A Theory of Social Action"
Autor: Anton Leist
Seite: 180-205

Abstract: This critical review concentrates on four important parts of Raimo Tuomela's analytical theory of social action. It examines the book's reconstructions of social action, of practical reasoning in this context, of social norms and it investigates its claim to a conceptual individualism. The result is critical in several aspects. Tuomela's most original idea in the analysis of joint action, that of we-intentions, is not broad enough to cover more than a part of social action in the commonly understood sense. His 'social' practical reasoning incorporates an implausible premiss. The game-theoretical reconstruction of social norms strikes one as unlikely to be fulfilled in social reality. Hardly any of these analyses back up the individualist claims of Tuomela's project.

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Titel: We-Intentions and Social Action
Autor: Raimo Tuomela / Kaarlo Miller
Seite: 26-43

Abstract: In the paper "We-intentions and Social Action" conceptual issues related to intentional social action are studied. By social actions we here mean actions that are performed together by two or more agents. The central concept of we-intention is introduced and applied to the analysis of simple social practical reasoning. An individualistic analysis of the notion of we-intention is proposed on the basis of the agents, I-intentions and beliefs. The need and indespensability of we-intentions and we-attitudes in general in a theory of intentional social action is emphasized along with the fact that we-intending leads to action in suitable circumstances.

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Work and Cooperation
2011 (33) Heft 1

Editorial
Both in social theories with the aim of looking into the creative core of society as well as in everyday politics, two intuitions often supplement each other. The first intuition, empirico-analytical, views common organization of work and production as being the very aim of society, and other parts of society being explicable from this. A second intuition, ethical or moral, holds the sphere of work to be the central site for diagnoses of a society's inherent justice. Both intuitions not only con...

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James S. Coleman's Foundations of Social Theory II
1993 (15) Heft 1

Editorial
In ANALYSE & KRITIK 2/92 wurde mit Beiträgen von Hartmut Esser, Karl-Dieter Opp, Russell Hardin, Norman Braun, Werner Raub, Dennis C Mueller und Peter Kappelhoff ein Symposium zu James S. Colemans vielbeachteten Buch Foundations of Social Theory eröffnet. In dem vorliegenden Heft wird dieses Symposium mit Beiträgen von Peter M. Blau, Raimo Tuomela, Andreas Diekmann, Michael Baurmann sowie einer Erwiderung von James S. Coleman weitergeführt. Ein Aufsatz von Michael Taylor wurde zwar nicht als...

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James S. Coleman's "Foundations of Social Theory" I
1992 (14) Heft 2

Editorial
James S. Colemans "Foundations of Social Theory" werden in ihrer Bedeutung für die Sozialwissenschaften von manchen mit Talcott Parsons' "Structure of Social Action" verglichen. Während jedoch Parsons mit seiner ,voluntaristischen Handlungstheorie, ein neues Paradigma für die Soziologie begründen wollte, stützt sich Coleman auf die ökonomische Theorie rationalen Handelns, die auch in der Soziologie bereits eine Forschungstradition hat. Anstatt eine grundsätzliche Neuerung in die Wege zu l...

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Methodologischer Individualismus
1986 (8) Heft 2

Editorial
Es gehört auch heute noch zu den Grundüberzeugungen vieler Soziologen, daß sich das Phänomen gesellschaftlicher Ordnung nicht auf Annahmen und Theorien über Individuen und individuelles Handeln zürückführen läßt. IndiViduelle Eigenschaften und Handlungen werden im Gegenteil selbst als einer soziologischen Erklärung bedürftig angesehen. Jeder "Individualismus" wird von diesen Soziologen deshalb strikt abgelehnt, sei es als methodologisches, normatives oder empirisches Programm. Gesell...

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ohne Titel
1985 (7) Heft 1

Editorial
In diesem Heft beginnen wir mit einer Reihe von Aufsätzen zu zwei thematischen Schwerpunkten: Grundlagenprobleme der Psychoanalyse und das Verhältnis von soziologischer und analytischer Handlungstheorie. In der Psychoanalyse deutet einiges darauf hin, daß die theoretische Diskussion in eine neue Phase tritt. Bisher konnte die psychoanalytische Praxis nur modellhaft oder abstrakt zum Gegenstand der Forschung gemacht werden, nur in Ausnahmefällen hatten Wissenschaftler direkten Zugang zur psyc...

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