Analyse & Kritik

Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory

Suchergebnisse

"Jan Narveson"

Titel: Comment on Tilo Wesche
Autor: Jan Narveson
Seite: 113-119

On Property-Owning Democracy

Abstract: The gist of Welsche’s argument seems to be to pick up on an idea he attributes to Rawls, that in a true property-owning democracy, productive wealth would be distributed more broadly ’ex ante’ rather than, as now, ’ex post’, the point of demarcation being the use of capital to generate wealth and income. As against this, I argue that ex ante distribution of capital is impossible, because business activity creates wealth, and thus we don’t know what there is to distribute ex ante. Moreover, the prospect of greater wealth for the producers ex post is what especially motivates them to produce, and without production we are poor. It is also noted that Rawls’s ’difference principle’ does not in fact have the egalitarian implications he supposes, nor really any distributive implications, despite Rawls’s intentions.

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Titel: Libertarianism on the Brink
Autor: James P. Sterba
Seite: 189-201

I argue that recent developments in my on-going debate with Jan Narveson have brought libertarianism to the brink where it is now able to cross over and join forces with welfare liberalism and even socialism. I summarize my debate with Narveson and then argue that a public concession Narveson made at recent meeting along with a new argument he advanced in response to that public concession have now brought libertarianism to this momentous brink where it can now be seen to cross over into the welcoming arms of welfare liberals and socialists.

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Titel: Sterba on Liberty and Welfarism
Autor: Jan Narveson
Seite: 203-221

James Sterba advances several arguments designed to show that libertarianism, contrary to what this author and other libertarians think, actually implies support for welfarism and even egalitarianism. This discussion shows why his arguments do not work. There is preliminary discussion of our parameters: how much is Sterba claiming we have a minimum right to in the way of welfare? It is argued that if this is set very low, a libertarian society would easily eliminate the poverty he is concerned about, and if it is set very high, then the standard could be unmeetable and certainly could not have been met until very recently at the least. More abstractly, it is argue that Sterba is in error about the normative assumptions required for libertarianism’s strong distinction between nonharm and outright help. Once these are cleared up, it is seen that his case depends on equivocation. The duty not to harm simply does not imply a duty to help. In the closing pages, a contractarian framework is advanced to explain the libertarian’s disaffection for the kind of ’strong’ rights Sterba wants to uphold.

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Titel: A Response to Jan Narveson: Why Libertarians Are and Are Not Like Turnips
Autor: James P. Sterba
Seite: 223-232

I show how Jan Narveson’s critique fails to unseat my central argument that harm cuts both ways in our assumed idealized conflict situations, such that sometimes the poor harm the rich and sometimes the rich harm the poor. I further show how this supports my overall argument that libertarianism has gone over the brink into the waiting arms of welfare liberals and socialists. I also reject the other reasons that Narveson provides for not recognizing the welfare rights of distant peoples and future generations which are independent of my argument about harm.

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Titel: Reason and Morality in the Age of Nuclear Deterrence
Autor: Jan Narveson
Seite: 206-232

Abstract: The argument in this paper is that althaugh rationality and morality are distinguishable concepts, there is nevertheless a rational morality, a set of principles, namely, which it is rational of all to require of all. The argument of this paper is that such a morality would certainly issue in a general condemnation of aggressive war. (Whether this also makes it irrational for States to engage in such activities is another, and not entirely settled, matter.) Correlatively, it would issue in a strong right of defense. Would this right be sufficient to include resort to nuclear deterrence, if need be? It is argued that the answer must be in the affirmative - although the question of 'need' is by no means settled in current circumstances.

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Titel: ‘Property-Owning Democracy’? ‘Liberal Socialism’? Or Just Plain Capitalism?
Autor: Jan Narveson
Seite: 393-405

Justin Holt argues that the Rawlsian requirements for justice are, con trary to Rawls’ own pronouncements, better met by socialism than ‘property owning democracy’, both of them preferring both to just plain capitalism, even with a welfare state tacked on. I suggest that Rawls’s ‘requirements’ are far less clear than most think, and that the only clarified version prefers the capitalist welfare state.

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Titel: Moral Objectivity and Property: The Justice of Liberal Socialism
Autor: Justin P. Holt
Seite: 413-419

This paper restates the thesis of ‘The Requirements of Justice and Liberal Socialism’where itwas argued that liberal socialism best meets Rawlsian requirements of justice. The recent responses to this article by Jan Narveson, Jeppe von Platz, and Alan Thomas merit examination and comment. This reply shows that if Rawlsian justice is to be met, then non-personal property must be subject to public control. If just outcomes merit the public control of non-personal property and this control is not utilized, then justice has been subordinated to the objectively less important institution of private property.

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Property-Owning Democracy
2013 (35) Heft 1
Guest-Editors: Francis Cheneval / Christoph Laszlo

Editorial
In recent years, ’property-owning democracy’ (POD), defined by widespread ownership of productive assets, has become one of the key-factors in the assessment of the institutional design implied in John Rawls’s theory of justice. The wider implications of this inquiry also engage scholars who do not subscribe to Rawls’s conception of justice but are broadly interested in normative questions of political economy and the basic structure of a just polity. In the course of this debate, the in...

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The Normative Turn from Marxism
2015 (37) Heft 1

Editorial
Marxism, both as a Western political movement and an intellectual focus of dispute, lost its academic appeal during the 1970s and 80s, foreshadowing the collapse of `actually existing´ socialism in the early 90s. Within what after the Second World War was called `Western Marxism´, there had been growing awareness of Marx’s early philosophy with its suggestive, if somewhat vague, ideas of a universally productive life and an ideal productive society. In contrast, the stock of (not only offici...

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Der ökonomische Ansatz in den Sozialwissenschaften I
1988 (10) Heft 2

Editorial
Die Überzeugungskraft und der Erfolg des ökonomischen Ansatzes ist wesentlich verbunden mit seinem methodologischen Individualismus und seiner Theorie der rationalen Entscheidung: 1. Komplexe soziale Tatsachen werden erklärt durch Zurückführung auf ein einheitliches Fundament, dessen elementare Bedeutung für jedermann nachvollziehbar ist: auf individuelle Entscheidungen, die Menschen in bestimmten Situationen zwischen verschiedenen Handlungsmöglichkeiten treffen. 2. Diese Entscheidungen w...

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