Suchergebnisse
"Andreas Diekmann"
Titel: Sozialkapital und das Kooperationsproblem in sozialen Dilemmata
Autor: Andreas Diekmann
Seite: 22-35
Abstract: Coleman's Foundations devotes much attention to the role of 'social capital' in solving problems of cooperation in dilemma situations. In contrast to the human capital approach, however, there is no stringent theory of social capital allowing for the deduction of empirically testable hypotheses from a set of general principles. This article demonstrates by means of various examples that social capital is an important exogenous factor inducing the evolution of cooperation and the stabilization of cooperation in N-person dilemmas. Some preliminary suggestions are made concerning the measurement of social capital and its ,rate of return, as a productive factor contributing to the cooperative solution in dilemma situations.
Titel: Reply to Blau, Tuomela, Diekmann and Baurmann
Autor: James S. Coleman
Seite: 62-69
Abstract: This reply responds to four authors in this issue of ANALYSE & KRITIK. I find disagreements with Peter Blau being of a lesser degree than he sees them, though I emphasize the micro-macro relation through which actions combine to produce systemic outcomes, while he emphasizes the effect of social structure upon individuals. Raimo Tuomela exposites a concept of group action which has some differences from my concept of corporate action, but many similarities. Andreas Diekmann examines in detail the problems of collective action toward provision of a public good. From Foundations he makes use of the concept of social capital, showing how with further development it might prove analytically useful; I encourage this direction of work. Michael Baurmann wants to lay a foundation of norms in place of the rights foundation which I develop. While I reject this shift, I largely accept his critique of my position regarding normative theory.
Titel: Kooperative Strategien im Gefangenendilemma. Computersimulation eines N-Personen-Spiels
Autor: Andreas Diekmann / Klaus Manhart
Seite: 134-153
Abstract: Simulation studies in the context of Robert Axelrod's research on iterative prisoner's dilemma games focus nearly exclusively on the two-player-version of the game. In contrast, this article reports results of a simulation with an iterated N-prisoners, dilemma where group size N varies between 2 and 30. The simulation investigates the relative performance of conditional cooperative strategies with increasing group size. Results show that some 'nice' strategies like 'tit-for-tat' are relatively successful and robust even in larger groups and non-nice environments. However, this does not solve the cooperation problem. On the contrary, the relative success of some 'nice' conditional cooperative strategies is paralleled by a rapid decline of cooperation in large groups.
James S. Coleman's Foundations of Social Theory II
1993 (15) Heft 1
Editorial
In ANALYSE & KRITIK 2/92 wurde mit Beiträgen von Hartmut Esser, Karl-Dieter Opp, Russell Hardin, Norman Braun, Werner Raub, Dennis C Mueller und Peter Kappelhoff ein Symposium zu James S. Colemans vielbeachteten Buch Foundations of Social Theory eröffnet. In dem vorliegenden Heft wird dieses Symposium mit Beiträgen von Peter M. Blau, Raimo Tuomela, Andreas Diekmann, Michael Baurmann sowie einer Erwiderung von James S. Coleman weitergeführt. Ein Aufsatz von Michael Taylor wurde zwar nicht als...
James S. Coleman's "Foundations of Social Theory" I
1992 (14) Heft 2
Editorial
James S. Colemans "Foundations of Social Theory" werden in ihrer Bedeutung für die Sozialwissenschaften von manchen mit Talcott Parsons' "Structure of Social Action" verglichen. Während jedoch Parsons mit seiner ,voluntaristischen Handlungstheorie, ein neues Paradigma für die Soziologie begründen wollte, stützt sich Coleman auf die ökonomische Theorie rationalen Handelns, die auch in der Soziologie bereits eine Forschungstradition hat. Anstatt eine grundsätzliche Neuerung in die Wege zu l...