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2006 (28) Issue 1
Symposium on Kenneth Binmore's "Natural Justice"
Abstracts | Table of Contents
Ken Binmore
Justice as a Natural Phenomenon
1-12 "He who understands Baboon would do more
towards metaphysics than John Locke." (Charles Darwin) Abstract: This paper summarizes a theory of fairness that replaces the metaphysical
foundations of the egalitarian theory of John Rawls and the utilitarian theory of John
Harsanyi with evolutionary arguments. As such, it represents an attempt to realize
John Mackie’s call for a theory based on the data provided by anthroplogists and the
propositions proved by game theorists. The basic claim is that fairness norms evolved
as a device for selecting one of the infinity of efficient equilibria of the repeated game
of life played by our prehuman ancestors. Go back | Top of Page
Anthony de Jasay
Fairness as Justice
13-31 Abstract: The paper questions Binmore’s identification of justice with fairness and his
corresponding focus on bargains to the neglect of conventions, notably of ownership.
Section 1 deals mainly with the role ascribed to man’s earliest genetic heritage in
shaping fairness norms and the putative effect of such norms on bargaining solutions.
Section 2 argues that the scope of fairness as opposed to justice in determining the social
order is quite narrow, It sketches a theory of fairness distinct from justice, derived from
the principle of treating like cases alike. Go back | Top of Page
Jonathan Riley
Genes, Memes and Justice
32-56 Abstract: Ken Binmore argues that justice consists in a proportional bargaining equi-
librium of a ‘game of morals’, which corresponds to a Nash bargaining equilibrium of
a ‘game of life’. His argument seems unassailable if rational agents are predominantly
self-interested, an assumption that he is apparently willing to make on the grounds that
human behaviour is ultimately constrained in accord with the selfish gene paradigm.
But there is no compelling scientific evidence for that paradigm. Rather, human nature
appears to be highly plastic. If so, rational agents might eventually be moulded by
cultural forces into social and moral actors who effectively believe that they are the
same person—no different from anyone else—when it comes to certain vital personal
interests which ought to be treated as rights. In this context, a utilitarian outcome is an
efficient and fair equilibrium of the game of life. Compliance with the rules is enforced
by the actor’s own conscience, a powerful internal ‘judicious spectator’ which threatens
to inflict harsh punishment in the form of intense feelings of guilt for cheating. Go back | Top of Page
Russell Hardin
The Genetics of Cooperation
57-65 Abstract: Binmore analyzes the genetic basis of cooperation. Much of the literature
doing this supposes that we must explain directly the cooperative tendency, whether
by individual or group selection. A more effective way to go is to find something more
general and likely more deeply embedded in personal traits that enables and even en-
hances cooperation. Hume, with whom Binmore claims affinities, long ago proposed a
psychological phenomenon now called mirroring, which induces good relations through
shared sentiments in a way that is essentially hard-wired. Mirroring indirectly con-
tributes to cooperativeness. There may be other similarly indirect ways to account for
human cooperativeness. Go back | Top of Page
Dieter Birnbacher
Binmore’s Humeanism
66–70 Abstract: David Hume is quoted in Binmore’s book Natural Justice more than any
other author, past or present, and throughout with a markedly positive attitude. It
is argued that this affinity is reflected in many characteristic features of Binmore’s
approach to fairness and social justice and especially in the central role motivational
issues are made to play in his theory. It is further argued that Binmore shares with
Hume not only important strengths but also certain weaknesses, among them a ten-
dency to derive from the limited evidence of past history far-reaching statements on
human nature and the conditions thereby imposed on social morality. Go back | Top of Page
Bernd Lahno
Making Sense of Categorical Imperatives
71–82 Abstract: Naturalism, as Binmore understands the term, is characterized by a scientific
stance on moral behavior. Binmore claims that a naturalistic account of morality
necessarily goes with the conviction “that only hypothetical imperatives make any
sense”. In this paper it is argued that this claim is mistaken. First, as Hume’s theory
of promising shows, naturalism in the sense of Binmore is very well compatible with
acknowledging the importance of categorical imperatives in moral practice. Moreover,
second, if Binmore’s own theory of moral practice and its evolution is correct, then
the actual moral practice does—and in fact must—incorporate norms, which have the
form of a categorical imperative. Categorical imperatives are part of social reality and,
therefore, any (normative) moral theory that adequately reflects moral practice must
also include categorical imperatives. Go back | Top of Page
Fabienne Peter
Justice: Political Not Natural
83–88 Abstract: Ken Binmore casts his naturalist theory of justice in opposition to theories
of justice that claim authority on the grounds of some religious or moral doctrine.
He thereby overlooks the possibility of a political conception of justice—a theory of
justice based on the premise that there is an irreducible pluralism of metaphysical,
epistemological, and moral doctrines. In my brief comment I shall argue that the
naturalist theory of justice advocated by Binmore should be conceived of as belonging
to one family of such doctrines, but not as overriding a political conception of justice. Go back | Top of Page
Christoph Schmidt-Petri
Binmore’s Egalitarianism
89-94 Abstract: In this short commentary on Ken Binmore’s Natural Justice I primarily
examine the relationship between mainstream egalitarian theories and Binmore’s ap-
proach. I argue that Binmore uses key concepts in non-standard ways. As a result, he
doesn’t engage enough with the views he criticises. Go back | Top of Page
Fiery Cushman / Liane Young / Marc Hauser
The Psychology of Justice
95–98 Abstract: In Natural Justice Binmore offers a game-theoretic map to the landscape
of human morality. Following a long tradition of such accounts, Binmore’s argument
concerns the forces of biological and cultural evolution that have shaped our judgments
about the appropriate distribution of resources. In this sense, Binmore focuses on
the morality of outcomes. This is a valuable perspective to which we add a friendly
amendment from our own research: moral judgments appear to depend on process just
as much as outcome. What matters is not just that the butler is dead, but who killed
him, how, and for what reason. Thus, a complete understanding of natural justice’
will entail an account not only of evolutionary pressures, but also of the psychological
mechanisms upon which they act. Go back | Top of Page
Brian Skyrms
Ken Binmore’s Natural Justice
99–101 Abstract: I raise a few questions about key points in the argument of Natural Jus-
tice. 1. The pivotal role assigned to the theory of indefinitely repeated games appears
to be both implausible and unnecessary. 2. The evolutionary foundations of the Nash
bargaining solution are not completely secure, and its role in the account of interper-
sonal comparisones of utility is questionable. 3. Free renegotiation behind the veil of
ignorance appears neither to have an evolutionary rationale nor to be a brute fact
about the way men are. Go back | Top of Page
Douglass C. North
On Kenneth Binmore’s Natural Justice
102–103 Abstract: Ken Binmore has written an exciting book and I am in complete agreement
with his ob jectives and conclusions. But his approach is flawed because of his reliance
on tools of analysis to understand the way the mind and brain have developed that are
not up to explaining our evolving understanding of the human environment. Go back | Top of Page
Marlies Ahlert / Hartmut Kliemt
Binmore, Boundedly Rational
104-110 Abstract: It is argued that a truly Humean approach to social interaction and to
normative reflection on how we should interact needs to get even closer to the facts than
the Binmore program suggests. In view of the facts Binmore’s normative conclusions
on bargaining as well as on the nature of the equilibria of the game of life both seem
precarious. Go back | Top of Page
Ken Binmore
Natural Justice: Response to Comments
111-117 Abstract: The following responses to the scholars who were kind enough to comment
on my Natural Justice in this symposium have been kept to a minimum by addressing
only issues where I think a misunderstanding may have arisen. Go back | Top of Page
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