Diskussion/Discussion

Kommentar zu A. MacIntyre: The Claims of 'After Virtue' (Analyse & Kritik 1/84)

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Cultural Pessimism and the Setting aside of Marxism

Abstract: I examine Alasdair MacIntyre's grounds for setting aside Marxism. I find them wanting. I argue that his criticisms are either unsound or fail to consider plausible alternative readings of Marxism which would elude what, on the reading MacIntyre gives, are sound criticisms. I consider MacIntyre's remarks about Marx's predictions, his remarks about the moral failures of Marxism and its alleged theoretical impoverishment in considering questions of value.

Alasdair MacIntyre, rightly I believe, sees Marx and Marxism as part of the Enlightenment tradition. He thinks of that tradition as not only intellectually and morally flawed, he even puts the case more strongly against the Enlightenment: he views its morality and its moral philosophy as being in utter disarray (MacIntyre 1981a; 1981b; 1983b; see also Dworkin 1981 in response to MacIntyre 1981b). Indeed, in his view, all of contemporary morality, and the moral philosophy which as much reflects it as it reflects upon it, is in such disarray because of the fact that it is no more than the fragments of a conceptual scheme which has long ago lost the context which once made it intelligible. Marxism, as much as liberalism, is implicated here. For all his greatness, a greatness MacIntyre fully acknowledges, Marx's views, generally, and specifically Marx's picture of morality, suffers, MacIntyre believes, from these defects of modernity and does nothing to replace what MacIntyre takes to be the moral incoherence of individualism and liberalism.

Given the depth of MacIntyre's cultural pessimism, his feeling that the barbarians are already with us and that our prospects for the future are, to put it minimally, not very bright, it is well to see how strong his critique of Marxism is and how weak is the Marxist case for providing grounds for optimism about the future and with that for rejecting MacIntyre's bleak picture of the future.
In After Virtue MacIntyre presupposes his case against Marxism and does not argue for it. To see how strong his case against Marxism is we must consider as well his earlier writings.

II

In doing this I want to start from a criticism of Marx and Marxism MacIntyre discusses, made familiar from the work of Karl Popper. MacIntyre thinks it is a justifiable criticism of Engels and indeed of Marx as well if we read Marx as does Engels and indeed many others who have followed him here. However, MacIntyre believes, or rather believed at one stage of his career, that here Engels has misread Marx and he provides another reading of Marx which frees him from these difficulties. But MacIntyre does agree with Popper that if Marx is read as Engels reads him, then Marx’s account is importantly mistaken. Since this ‘Engelsian way’ is a very characteristic way of reading Marx and has the authority of Engels behind it, it is important that we inspect it. It, at root, concerns the alleged unconditional nature of Marx’s predictions.

Engels, MacIntyre contends, presents Marxism as a systematic science of both nature and society. Certain very general high-order laws govern all natural and social processes. Given these laws, the transition from capitalism to socialism is both inevitable and scientifically predictable (MacIntyre 1953, 88). (After all, it could be one without being the other because of logical limits about predictability.)

Let us see what these ‘unconditional predictions’ are. Capitalism is a self-destructive system on Marx’s analysis, for it must either expand or perish. What Marx is predicting is that capitalism will be unable to distribute what it produces and this will result in crises in which investment will be drastically reduced and that, in turn, will be accompanied by considerable unemployment. Marx also predicts that under capitalistic relations of production large, and indeed ever larger, scale industry will develop so that capitalism will become monopoly capital with an ever greater polarization of classes and the evolving of an organized and self-conscious working class which slowly comes to realize that it has no interest in the continuation of capitalistic socio-economic systems. These are fundamental predictions purportedly derivable from Marx’s theories and laws. Moreover, on such a reading of Marx’s account, capitalism will have these outcomes and must inevitably break down.

However, suppose we ask, now turning to MacIntyre’s and Popper’s criticisms, why the intelligentsia, working in support of the capitalist system, cannot come to learn the lessons of Capital and persuade capitalists to modify their behaviour in the light of these claims and predictions. As MacIntyre puts it, “Marx’s analysis of capitalism is a correct analysis
of its workings only so long as the capitalist does not become conscious of those workings in a way that enables him to modify them." (MacIntyre 1953, 84) Moreover, and more generally, it is vital to realize that to be scientific, predictions must always be conditional and if Marx's predictions turned out to be false because conditions changed, this does not impugn the original predictions based on certain conditions prevailing, if indeed the predictions are taken, as they should be, as conditional. It only shows that Marx's predictions about the breakdown of capitalism or increasing class conscious proletarianization fail to be a part of the corpus of science if they are made unconditionally.

However, the difficulty is, MacIntyre and Popper maintain, that Engels turns them into prophecies rather than predictions by treating them unconditionally and Marx sometimes appears at least to do so himself. Indeed, in an essay subsequent to Marxism and Christianity, MacIntyre claims that the mature Marx does so himself (see his 1964, 106-8). But whatever may be the differences between Marx and Engels or whatever Engels or Marx may or may not have said, let us look at the logic of the issue given an 'Engelsian' reading of Marx. If Marx's predictions are taken in a conditional form then we get something like the following: if capitalism remains unmodified and develops as a result in the following ways then such and such conditions will obtain and capitalism will break down and be replaced by socialism. But that, of course, is not to say (full stop) that capitalism will break down and be replaced by socialism.

Popper's point (accepted by MacIntyre) is that even if there are laws of the sort Marxists state, "a knowledge of the laws which hold in a given situation is never sufficient by itself to enable us to predict" (MacIntyre 1953, 85). A law, I should perhaps add, is taken here to be a statement of a regularity such that of two classes of events the occurrence of an event of one kind is at least a sufficient condition for the occurrence of an event of the other kind. An example would be: whenever commodity production is more generalized there will be a greater regulation of labour. To predict what we need to know we must also have a knowledge of particular factual conditions. We need, that is, to know whether and what particular antecedent and concomitant conditions hold. We have the law: if commodity production is generalized to degree $L$ then labour will be regulated to degree $S$ and in manner $Y$. But we can only conclude that labour will be regulated to degree $S$ and in manner $Y$, if we know the commodity production is actually generalized to degree $L$. But this is a singular existential statement, not a statement of law and we cannot know that that statement is true simply from knowing the truth of any laws of society or economics, if such there be. Moreover, we must know that no external conditions - say types of capitalist intervention - make that singular existential statement false.
Popper maintains that Marx confuses laws with trends, the latter being a sequence of historical events moving in a certain direction, e.g. an increasing polarization of class will obtain as capitalism develops. To predict a trend, we must know both the laws and the relevant antecedent and concomitant conditions. But we cannot predict trends unconditionally. Yet, Popper claims, it is just this that Marx and Engels try to do. But to attempt to make unconditional predictions is to move from science to pseudo-science masquerading as science.

In Marxism and Christianity MacIntyre argues that this is indeed an error but that it is an error Engels makes but not an error that Marx makes. In discussing Russia, Marx makes precisely the distinction between trends and laws that Popper says he is unaware of and he also is quite aware that there can be alternative types of historical development. In other words, we cannot be sure that history will unfold in a certain way or that there must be a definite general pattern of historical change. But admitting this possibility, how then can Marx be as confident as he is, say in the Communist Manifesto, that capitalism will collapse and will be followed by socialism? It is, in MacIntyre's opinion, a false mechanistic interpretation of Marxism, stemming from Engels, receiving its development in Kautsky and a rather simplistic popularization in Stalin, to view the "road to socialism as law-governed because all history is law-governed and moves forward inevitably ..." (MacIntyre 1953, 100).

Genuinely scientific claims cannot be unconditional and we must recognize the metaphysical and mystifying nature of claims of historical inevitability. While the role of falsification in science may be far more indirect than the positivists envisaged, we still cannot have laws or trend statements for which there is no confirming or disconfirming evidence and we cannot have unfalsifiable hypotheses.

III

Surely, MacIntyre is on solid ground in stressing that Marx's account was neither mechanistic nor fatalistic. And he is right to point out that Marx did stress praxis and revolutionary activity and did not believe that we could definitely predict and then simply await the coming of the revolution as we await the coming of an eclipse (MacIntyre 1953, 95). He is also right in stressing Marx's claim that men make their own history, though they make it in a determinate way under conditions which are not of their own making. And MacIntyre is justified, as against, on the one hand, reaction ary cold war Ideologists such as Lewis Feuer and Sidney Hook and some old fashioned Marxist-Leninists, on the other, in stressing the continued importance in Marx's work of the concept of alienation and in making us aware of the importance Marx attributed to the belief, inherited from the
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Enlightenment, that human beings will be able to make sense of their own lives, develop their own powers and construct a truly human society, once certain barriers and restrictions have been removed. Perhaps all of this is pie-in-the-sky, but it is Marx.

However, Marx was also concerned to make predictions, though perhaps not, à la Kautsky and Stalin, predictions of inevitable progress. He took his economic analysis to be at the heart of his theory and he thought that this would provide us with an analysis not only of what societies were like and are like now but it would give us some soundly based beliefs about how in a very general way they would develop. He was, however, too much of a Hegelian and too much of a realist to think that we could have any detailed blueprints here. But this is not to deny we could have some general knowledge. If such a general knowledge of human development proves impossible, it would be a serious blow not just to Engels' aspirations but to Marx's as well. Marx thought that he was doing social science and not just giving us a moral view of the world or a reasonable ideological perspective. We may be mistaken in holding him to any very specific predictions about the transition to socialism. But he surely did appear to believe he had some conception of how and why epochal social change occurred and he had some conception of the socio-economic conditions requisite for the occurrence of a socialist revolution and the establishment of a socialist order.

MacIntyre himself, along with Charles Taylor, William Dray and Peter Winch, has made important theoretical contributions to a conception of social science which claims that it is in the nature of the case that social science is importantly different from the natural science. It is unavoidably interpretive, it is not and cannot, they argue, be value-free, has in part a different conception of explanation than natural science, must get along without laws and essentially gives after-the-event interpretations rather than precise predictions. Having this conception of social science, it is not surprising that MacIntyre attaches considerable importance to Georg Lukács' claim in History and Class Consciousness that Marx's interpretation of previous social orders, including capitalism, are after-the-event interpretations. The claim is that Marx gives no laws, and indeed can give no laws, that make claims about the future in accordance with which we would make predictions. MacIntyre interprets with approval Lukács as claiming:

"The future of which Marxism speaks is not a future determined by laws and predicted by passive spectators of the law-governed processes of history; it is a future that will be constructed in accordance with the intentions of those same self-conscious agents whose consciousness is articulated by Marxist theory. For Lukács, Marxism is not just a theoretical analysis advanced by an individual theorist - an analysis that is true or false in terms of its correspondence
to an external social reality, the truth or falsity of which can be shown only by the power of the theory to generate predictions about such a reality. Rather, Marxism is that consciousness which is constitutive of contemporary social reality - contemporary, that is, for the age to which both Marx and Lukács belong - and as such is itself a basic social datum." (MacIntyre 1953, 98-9)

Behind this there lies a body of important, though certainly not uncontestable, theorizing about the nature of social science. (I doubt if anyone, who did not know the work of Peter Winch, John Searle or Charles Taylor, could make much sense of MacIntyre's dark saying about social reality and about something being constitutive of social reality.) If that theorizing is right or even very near to the mark, then it would be, in that respect, a 'Lukácsian Marx' which we should accept if we concur in any thorough way with Marx at all. That is to say, if there is much in Marx's account, it will, MacIntyre claims, have to take that form. Otherwise, it is just mistakenly scientistic, not scientific. (It is important to keep in mind that Lukács did not think of himself as revising Marx but as elucidating him.)

However, important as that interpretive conception of social science is, it remains thoroughly controversial. One should move with caution in just accepting it as a basis for giving either an interpretation of or a rational reconstruction of Marx. Moreover, if we do take that reading we move a long way from Marx's intentions. He thought that he could make predictions, though, as far as I can see, he did not think he should make unconditional ones and he did not think there was a radical difference between the social sciences and the natural sciences.

Going back to the more standard picture of Marx as the more authentic Marx, we need to face certain haunting questions churned up by MacIntyre. Taking Marx's predictions seriously what are we to say to these remarks:
(a) Marx predicted the decline of capitalism, but, against this, Edward Bernstein pointed to the fact of its steady expansion and consolidation;
(b) while Marx predicted the radicalization of the working class, Bernstein pointed to the fact of its growing domestication?

IV

In the last chapter of Marxism and Christianity, MacIntyre returns to these problems about Marx's predictions. He says, rather ignoring his Lukácsian Marx we have just discussed, that one of the two main difficulties that anyone who wants to claim that Marxism is substantially true must face is the fate of Marx's predictions. (The other is what he calls "the impotence of Marxist economic theory". But he simply asserts this.)
In facing this problem, there are different strategies that Marxists can take. One evident one, stemming from Franz Mehring, claims that while Marx and Engels were "substantially right about the sequence of events to come", they "were wrong about the time scale" (MacIntyre 1953, 118). MacIntyre responds that while initially this perhaps had some plausibility, after 1945 it has become evident that it is patently false. Writing in 1953, MacIntyre claims that there is no good evidence for the belief that capitalism is in a crisis. In the post-war period, capitalism has exhibited a rather extensive capacity to innovate in order "to maintain its equilibrium and its expansion ..." (120). There were the usual techniques of developed capitalism: state intervention, planning of the market, close relations between the state and large corporations and the management of the flow of credit. However, what is even more striking about contemporary capitalism, in spite of its laissez faire ideology, is the overall and extensive management of the economy as a whole. This, MacIntyre claims, undermines Marx's notions about an anarchy of production relations and has, as MacIntyre puts it, "rendered obsolete the notion of capitalism as essentially a form of unplanned economy to which state intervention was alien except in marginal cases" (120-21).

This innovation cuts deep for now we need a subsidiary hypothesis not just to explain why the crisis in capitalism has been so long in coming but why it is plausible to believe that it will occur at all, given that such overall management has become a reality in capitalist society.

More generally, as MacIntyre puts it in his little 1964 essay simply entitled "Marx", Marx was mistaken in his predictions about the falling-rate of profit and about the possibilities of expansion which will in the future be available to capitalists (MacIntyre 1964, 107). Marx radically underrated the role of technological innovation and he failed to anticipate the battery of welfare-state methods that have come into being to avoid under-consumption. In general, he failed to reckon with the possibility of capitalist and their supporting intelligentsia coming to understand the system and taking steps to prevent it from collapsing in the way Marx had predicted.

Marx's related hypothesis that there would develop a growing revolutionary class has also not panned out and the supplementary hypotheses to account for its not doing so turned out to be implausible. To attribute the failure to bad theory or practice among the revolutionaries or to the fact that the leaders of the working class have been repeatedly co-opted by the ruling class does not face some salient facts. One of the most evident is that in the capitalist centre the working class - and not just its leadership - is either "reformist or unpoltical except in the most exceptional of circumstances, not so much because of the inadequacies of its trade union and political leadership as because of its whole habit of life" (MacIntyre 1953, 119). The absolute advance in the standard of living of the working
class in the capitalist centres, even with its unpublicized relative deprivation with much the same disparities of income between them and the capitalist class persisting, made its conditions of existence very different than in earlier times such that there seems to be little evidence that the working class in such centres is likely to rebel. Revolution in the capitalist centres does not seem to be in the offing. People are not standing in lines in soup kitchens for any considerable number, workers have unions, personal property (e.g. houses and cars) and (usually) some sort of minimal security. The present union bashing in the USA, the emergence of some soup kitchen conditions there and the worsening of the condition of labor may be less of a worldwide capitalist phenomena than a Reagan phenomena that may shift with a shift in government, though we should not forget that now (1984) thirty five million people are out of work in the Western capitalist countries. But it is difficult to know how long lasting this is going to be.

Bernstein, writing at the turn of the century, pointed to the fact that capitalism was still expanding and the working class was becoming more rather than less domesticated. That was some thirty-odd years after the publication of the first volume of Capital. The situation still seems to be the same with us, some seventy-odd years after Bernstein made his claims. Does this simply betoken that something was wrong with Marx's timespan or that we have not found the right subsidiary hypotheses? If anything is to save Marx's predictions, it would seem to me that it would be a battery of very plausible subsidiary hypotheses. But what are they? And can Marx's predictions be saved? Indeed, what exactly do they come to when put in a conditional form and, so taken, what is their social relevance? And if they are not put in a conditional form, are not Popper and MacIntyre justified in regarding them as prophecies which could not possibly be part of the corpus of science?

V

What I want to note next is how some of MacIntyre's positive comments on Marx lead all the same to a different but important criticism of Marx. Marx in his doctrine of human nature and alienation and de-alienation gives us, as MacIntyre put it, "truths about the human condition which cannot as yet be found elsewhere" (MacIntyre 1953, 140). Marx started out as a critic of liberalism and indeed his earliest criticisms of liberalism were from the inside on liberalism's own terms. But with his Or the Jewish Question Marx turned into a perceptive critic of liberalism and subsequently, as everyone knows, developed a distinctive holistic theory that (a) provided an alternative to liberalism and (b) systematically distances itself from liberalism.
It is MacIntyre's belief that Marx has provided a devastating critique of liberalism. He has unassailably shown its moral poverty; he has unmasked it as an ideology. "He approaches bourgeois society not as an external critic but as one who tries to show first the incoherence and falsity of the account which bourgeois society gives of itself in the form of liberal theory, and secondly, how both theory and social forms contain within themselves the seeds of their own transcendence." (140-1) Marx shows how liberalism reflects the atomistic compartmentalization of bourgeois society in its own theoretical constructions: compartmentalizations that erect general normative ethical theories which are of little use in an actual moral critique of society or of human preferences, how it separates political and economic man from social man and, more importantly still, how it can "combine within itself a drive towards ideals of political equality with an actual fostering of economic inequality" (133). In short, Marx is masterful at exposing the facade of liberal equality and humanism.

A society's ideology, MacIntyre maintains, is the image of itself which is necessarily engendered by the social forms of that society. It, as a society's self-consciousness of itself, is typically both revealing and distorting. Marx unmasks liberal ideology but he is less aware, MacIntyre argues, of ideological elements distorting his own thought. And later Marxists, Georg Lukács and Lucien Goldmann aside, have been still less aware of it.

It is here where talk of historical materialism is important. Marxism, originally a negative, skeptical and subversive doctrine, can and does get, MacIntyre argues, too uncritically attached to its own categories, failing to see (a) how distorting ideological elements can enter into them and (b) it exempts, unjustifiably, its own doctrines from the historical relativity which Marxists "are all too willing to ascribe to the doctrines of others" (IX). Lukács, alone among Marxists, saw in his History and Class Consciousness (1923) that historical materialism could not exempt itself from the treatment it accorded to all other doctrines.

MacIntyre, following Lukács, maintains that the central truth of historical materialism, when applied to philosophy, is that "all philosophical theories in some way or other bear the marks of the period in which they were first brought to birth" (136). If it is true, it must apply to Marxism as well and we must ask what distorting as well as revealing elements enter into it and how it is itself conditioned by certain forces and relations of production.

Lukács argues that to formulate historical materialism in such a way that for all societies the base and superstructure are merely causally and externally related is a way of reifying the structure of bourgeois society rather than to see it as something which is distinctive of bourgeois
societies but by no means as something which is universally applicable to the anatomy of all societies. As MacIntyre puts it, "the separation between the state and the free market economy in bourgeois practice is reflected not only in the analytical categories of liberalism, but also in those of Marxism" (137). The abstract categories of Marx and Marxism need probing in the very same manner as those of liberalism. We need to turn Marx's historical method - the method of historical materialism - back on the fundamental categories of Marxism itself and here, as elsewhere, we need to engage in ideology critique.

Class, for example, is typically defined by Marxists in terms of a relationship to the means of production. But the notion of ownership needs a probing it doesn't get from Marx, for, as MacIntyre puts it, "a definition of social class in terms of ownership is likely to lead precisely to that substitution of the ideal for the real which Marx condemned" (138). Indeed this happens, MacIntyre claims, in some Communist states where

"...the alleged classlessness, or approach to classlessness, in those states consists in the fact that all citizens share in the legal 'ownership' of the productive resources. But the real and very different relationships of different sections of the population to the political, social, and economic control of these resources and to the decision-making process involved are only masked by this appeal to the fiction of 'ownership with its roots in the interests of the actually ruling group'" (138)

Marxism here, MacIntyre argues, reveals its own contingent and historically conditioned background. But if historical materialism is true how could it be otherwise? We need both to be aware of this inescapable historical relativity of categories and yet to see the truth in historicism, namely how in this relativity there can be a development (Avineri 1969, 83-4). Marx, and Hegel as well, gave us a key to that. What we need, MacIntyre argues, is to use basically Marxist methods to develop a critique of Marxism itself, for in the absence of such a critique Marxism

"...continually breeds degenerate forms of itself. Some of these are the doctrines of those who, because of the gap between the classical Marxist analysis and the realities of contemporary society, flee from the realities of that society into the private cloud-cuckoo lands of Marxist sectarianism where they tilt at capitalist windmills with Marxist texts in their hands, the Don Quixotes of the contemporary left." (MacIntyre 1953, 140-1)

And this kind of blindness does disservice to Marx and more importantly to contemporary social analysis and criticism, for, as MacIntyre is at pains to point out, or was at pains to point out when he wrote Marxism and Christianity, Marxism is alone in the contemporary world in providing us a systematic framework, tied to an emancipatory interest, with which to view and criticize society and to shape a view of the future. It alone of
secular ways of viewing things reestablishes hope as a social virtue. If, by running from such a critique, Marxism succeeds in an ideological manner in mystifying itself, we are lost in a bog of irrationalist ideologies.

Sometimes in writings of the vintage of *After Virtue*, MacIntyre, in stressing the disarray in morality and moral philosophy and the lack of consensus in the social sciences, seems to suggest that we are indeed so lost, but, after all, Aristotle, for him, has replaced a Hegelianized Marx and, as it is particularly clear when he is criticizing Richard Rorty, he, while perhaps being some kind of historicist, is not a relativist or nihilist who thinks that all we have available to us are clashing irrational ideologies, though it is possible to wonder, given the emptiness of his own positive views about grounding morality in an account of the virtues, whether he has actually transcended relativism.  

VI

There is something more fundamental that demands our attention: suppose MacIntyre is right in all his criticisms of Marxism we have hitherto discussed, would that justify his pessimism about the future and show Marxist historical optimism to be misplaced? MacIntyre, as we have seen, accepts its critique of liberalism. Indeed he may accept it too easily, undialectically failing to take note of important elements in liberalism that would remain a part of any human emancipation. Be that as it may, he does see Marxism as deeply implicated in liberalism's faults and as giving us no genuine grounds for historical optimism. But why not exactly? We know now that historical progress is not inevitable. Our future cannot be guaranteed. But so what? There is no such a quest for certainty among Marxist theoreticians of any stature. Contemporary Marxists must be good fallibilists (Ollman 1976). But that does not at all mean that Marxists cannot speak of certain historical trends and make claims about some scenarios being more likely than others and indeed having a greater emancipatory potential than others. That will remain a reasonable possibility even if all of MacIntyre's criticisms of Marxism were sustained. (I said nothing about 'absolute trends'. One can, and indeed should, be utterly Popperian here.)

Marxism, to turn to a distinct point, is not antagonistic to Aristotelian conceptions about certain conditions answering more fully to human needs than others and making, under different conditions, for greater or lesser flourishing. Indeed, as Richard Miller has powerfully argued, Aristotle's views here and Marx's are structurally very much alike (Miller 1981). So, if you buy, as MacIntyre does, Aristotle about ethics you get Marx as well. We have a conception of human emancipation tied to our understanding of what human flourishing consists in, though, if MacIntyre is right
about Marxism's ability to predict, we do not have any very precise idea of whether we are going to move to a greater emancipation or whether we will not more likely regress as a new barbarianism takes an ever firmer and more extended root. We can, that is, make no very precise predictions about what the future will bring.

To have much confidence in any historical scenario here, either of an emancipatory sort or of the arrival of a new barbarianism, we need in our social science greater predictive powers than MacIntyre believes is, or can be, available to us. Marxism, taking the optimistic side, needs to be a predictive science but in reality it isn't and cannot be. Or so, at least, MacIntyre claims. Marx predicted the falling rate of profit but it hasn't panned out that way; Marx also predicted the increasing polarization of classes and the increasing impoverishment of the workers, but, again that hasn't happened; he also predicted that there would be capitalist economic crises which capitalism would be increasingly unable to contain but again that hasn't happened. Capitalist imperialism has kept right on rolling along and capitalism, it has been argued, has become ever more a world system with an increased ability to gain world hegemony. With its control of the culture industry and its use of the Welfare State to avoid underconsumption and to provide worker's minimal security, it can, MacIntyre claims, avert capitalist crises. Capitalism has indeed been quite adept at this since the end of the Second World War.

Given such a capacity to make the world safe for capitalism, given such a failure of Marx's predictions, how can we reasonably maintain the optimism of Marxists? Here, if we are to avoid MacIntyre's pessimism about the human condition, I think we have to be able to show that the predictive picture is not as bleak as MacIntyre sometimes suggests. MacIntyre rightly sees, against conservatives and most liberals, the utter bleakness of our present and immediately foreseeable condition. Without some decent, rather holistic theory of social change, operating with some genuine empirical constraints and predictive reliability, we cannot reasonably have such historical optimism.

There are two quite different kinds of consideration with which we need to concern ourselves. Let me call them the empirical and the conceptual. By 'the empirical' in this context I mean claims about our ability to understand who we were, who we are now, and to make some educated guesses about who we may well become. That is, it has to do with whether we have any empirical warrant for any historical scenarios about what the future may bring. 'The conceptual', by contrast, strikes at the very idea of whether the human sciences could be predictive sciences. MacIntyre in several places, but most centrally in Chapter 8 of After Virtue, argues against such a conception of the human sciences. If he is right about the human sciences, it is hard to see how we could draw either dramatically
optimistic or pessimistic conclusions about the human condition. We could not know or reasonably believe anything on such a scale. On such a conception, Marx's predictions failed not because of empirical inadequacies in the design of his research, but for the reason that no such predictions are possible. I shall return to that conceptual issue later, but in the next section I shall consider the empirical issue, assuming, for the moment, something resembling what MacIntyre calls the Enlightenment picture of the social sciences, though perhaps devoid of Hempelian law-like generalizations (Nielsen 1982a).

VII

It seems to me, if, as we should, we look at things on a worldwide scale, the fate of Marx's predictions is not so bad as MacIntyre gives to understand. If we keep in mind the reality of capitalist imperialism and if we look at the whole world, it is not so evident that with the development of capitalism there has not continued to be a greater impoverishment of the proletariat and a greater polarization of the classes. Surely class structures are much more complex than Marx gave to understand and there are all sorts of intervening strata and people (e.g. intellectuals) whose class position is anomalous. But it is at least arguable that taking into consideration the Third World with, a), in much of it, its mass starvation in what were the formerly self-sufficient agrarian communities throughout Africa, Asia and South America, and b) with the formation of a proletariat and lumpen-proletariat in many of these communities, we have both increased impoverishment and pretty much the class polarization of which Marx spoke. 6

Similarly, while in 1953, when MacIntyre published Marxism and Christianity, it might have seemed plausible, with the capitalist expansion and consolidation after the war and with Keynesian economics working well, to claim that capitalist economic crises will not be severe and can readily be contained by generally Keynesian measures, this is by 1984 not nearly so evident. That notwithstanding, against Marx, it might be said that instead of capitalism's collapsing or tending to collapse, it has, through its imperialism, continued expanding and continued to gain greater world hegemony. Still, looked at from the perspective of 1984, it is not so certain that there are not building up severe economic crises that capitalism may not, after several decades, be able to contain. The economic crises of countries such as Brasil, Mexico and Nigeria may be bellweathers. The working of the IMF and similar capitalist institutions is not clearly in good order. The IMF's requirements of austerity are helping to produce militancy, class consciousness and instability. Yet it is also very hard to see how they, given their capitalist rationale, cannot but continue to require such austerity. This, however, may require a more extensive use of naked repression, but that, in turn, is hardly conducive to stability.
There are obviously a number of possibilities here, some of them frightening and supportive of MacIntyre's bleak vision. It is indeed evident for anyone who cares to see that these are dark times. But I think it is also evident that the jury is still out concerning the containability of the crises of capitalism, though we cannot be sure that it will be followed by socialism.

However, we may, under capitalist control, get an alternation between repressive and less repressive capitalist states (Chile may go from Fascism to bourgeois democracy to Fascism again), but it also is the case that states such as Greece, Italy and Chile may break out of capitalist control and, their numbers may multiply, and help trigger a more general liberation that may extend to the Capitalist centre. This, let me repeat, is just one of many scenarios, many of them less happy, but it is not one we can just rule out and it is a scenario around which class struggle can be organized.

Similar things need to be said about capitalism's world hegemony. It is true that there is an ever increasingly sophisticated capitalist imperialism penetrating, with the phenomena of neo-colonialism and the like, deeper into the capitalist periphery. Moreover, there are subtle ways in which this capitalist order tries even to tie state socialist societies to the capitalist world system, e.g. Hong Kong and China, Capitalist banks and Poland, the IMF and Yugoslavia. But it is anything but clear whether this capitalist tactic will succeed.

What is also clear is that since the end of the Second World War the number of societies that have in some sense 'gone socialist' has been steadily rising. Not all of these socialist societies may be entirely to the liking of independent Marxists - indeed none of them may be. Indeed, for some independent Marxists, my 'not entirely to their liking' may be entirely too mild a phrase, but be that as it may, in many instances these societies have partially, and sometimes entirely, broken out of the sphere of capitalist control. It seems, at least, given that, a mistake to speak of the world hegemony of capitalism.

The transition from capitalism to socialism will be long and bitter and indeed may not obtain. There can be no historical guarantees here. But MacIntyre's view about the fate of Marx's predictions, curiously, given MacIntyre's sensitivity to such matters, is too much a view from America. But in noting that, I do not want to go to the other extreme and turn them into claims of historical inevitability. That would not be to treat them as predictions. Still, to say this is little more than to give to understand that Marxists should be fallibilists and what Jon Elster has appropriately called skeptical Marxists (Elster 1981).
I want now to turn to the conceptual considerations. MacIntyre argues that in the human sciences we do not possess and will not come to possess a set of law-like generalizations governing social behaviour with a precisely specifiable scope and sustaining counterfactuals. There are in the human sciences no such generalizations. There are no true laws governing human behaviour which would enable us precisely to predict or retrodict human behaviour. We cannot reasonably make such predictions derived from a knowledge of such law-like generalizations because there are in the human sciences no true law-like generalizations. We need to come to see that the human sciences are not predictive sciences. Marxism, as MacIntyre claims, assumes that there are such laws and indeed, he further claims, it must assume that there are such laws to make its predictions or for historical materialism to be true, but there are no such laws and it is highly implausible to believe that there can be such laws, though he does not think we can demonstrate that there cannot be such laws (MacIntyre 1981a, 96). On such a reading, Marx was trying, like a good Hempelian, to make social science into something it is not and cannot be. It is no surprise that his predictions did not pan out.

MacIntyre does not deny, what would be absurd to deny, namely that there are generalizations, and even true generalizations in the human sciences, backed up with impressive research; what he denies is that they are true lawlike generalizations of the form ‘For all A’s and some B’s if A has the property x then B has the property y’. They are instead like ‘Most Swedes are Lutherans’. They lack universal quantifiers and scope modifiers; they admit of exceptions which do not falsify them and we “cannot say of them in any precise way under what conditions they hold.” (MacIntyre 1981a, 86 - emphasis mine) There are generalizations of the following sort: ‘Revolutions tend to occur when a period of rising and to some degree gratified expectations is followed by a period of set-backs when expectations continue to rise and are sharply disappointed’. There are acknowledged counter-examples to his generalization, but they are not taken to falsify or disconfirm it and no claim is made, by reasonably cautious social scientists, to “apply them systematically beyond the limits of observation to unobserved or hypothetical instances” (87). The generalizations of the human sciences are not even probabilistic laws. Rather, as MacIntyre puts it, they are generalizations such that even given our ‘best possible stock of generalizations, we may on the day be defeated by an unpredicted and unpredictable counter-example - and yet still see no way to improve upon our generalizations and still have no reason to abandon them or even to reformulate them” (88-9).

What we need to recognize is that there are systematic sources of unpredictability in human affairs. Here, following Karl Popper and some con-
temporary philosophy of science, MacIntyre gives us good grounds for believing that in certain domains there are logical restrictions on what we can predict. We cannot predict inventions or radical conceptual innovations. We cannot, for example, predict the future of physics, for if we could it would be our present physics and not the physics of the future. What we get in the social sciences is after the event explanations. Similarly, we cannot predict our own decisions or our own actions insofar as they depend on decisions not yet made by us. In addition there are pure historical contingencies which effect the course of history such as the fact that Napoleon had a cold during the battle of Waterloo and that Ney had four horses shot out from under him. (This is not, as MacIntyre recognizes, to be taken as an anti-determinist point.)

However, as we proceed in his chapter on "The Character of Generalizations in Social Science" in After Virtue, we come to see that he is not making as strong a claim as it first seemed. He remarks that while he has shown that there are unpredictable elements in social life, he readily acknowledges that there are predictable elements, and indeed important predictable elements as well (97-9). We can, for example, predict with reasonably accuracy many elements of social life that turn around scheduling and coordinating social action. There are around these parts of our social life vast regularities of a perfectly predictable sort. There are also many statistical regularities - such as the fact that suicide rates rise sharply around Christmas and that depressions are more common during a Chinook or the Fohn - that enable us to generate useful predictions. There are also causal regularities in social life such as that a person's place in the class structure of Nineteenth Century Germany strongly affected that person's educational opportunities.

His unequivocal rejection of the Enlightenment Project to the contrary notwithstanding, MacIntyre makes it quite clear that he believes that there is a "degree of predictability which our social structures possess which enable us to plan and engage in long-term projects..."(98). He counter-balances this with the claim, rooted in the various ways in which social science cannot predict what will happen, that "the pervasive unpredictability in human life also renders all our plans and projects permanently vulnerable and fragile" (98). MacIntyre believes that a major weakness of Marxism, a weakness it shares with Enlightenment philosophers generally, is in its illusory belief that this vulnerability and fragility of life can be overcome when we are at least freed from ignorance, ideological blindness, economic competitiveness and when for everyone the springs of social wealth finally flow fully. But, MacIntyre argues, it is neither desirable nor possible that "fragility and vulnerability could be overcome in some progressive future" (98). If life is to be meaningful, it is necessary not only "for us to be able to engage in long-term projects" requiring predictability, it is also necessary "for us to be in possession of ourselves and
not merely to be the creations of other people's projects, intentions and
desire and this requires unpredictability" (99). If our social life is to
have that character in reality and not just as a matter of ideological
illusion, our generalizations must not be such that they entail well-
defined sets of counterfactual conditions; they must instead of being
prefaced by "universal quantifiers", be prefaced by some such "phrase as
'characteristically and for the most part ....'" (98). What is humanly
desirable here, to make sense of our lives, also squares with the kinds of
generalizations we have actually been able to establish in the social
sciences. They are generalizations which allow us to remain to some degree
opaque to each other. But such a view of social science, MacIntyre claims,
is hardly compatible with historical materialism and with the predictive
rigor that Marxism aspires to and indeed requires.

I do not see why the general conception of social science that MacIntyre
characterizes and defends is not perfectly compatible with historical
materialism and I further do not see why Marxism, including the work of
Marx, need be tied to a conception of predictive rigor that is any stronger
than that which MacIntyre finds acceptable or why, or even that, Marx or
Marxists, in believing in a progressive future, need to deny the kind of
vulnerability and fragility of which MacIntyre speaks. There is no reason
why Marxism should be saddled with an eschatology or any metaphysical
belief in inevitability to say nothing of the perfectly wild notion that a
communist future is some kind of logical necessity. I shall in the next
section try to show why these things are so.

IX

MacIntyre sets too strong criteria for what it is for something to be a
predictive science. There are not many sciences, including some natural
sciences, that meet the criteria for 'strict predictability' set out by
MacIntyre. Yet, if you will, 'non-strict predictions' are made - as in
weather predictions and predictions about salmon stocks - which are some-
times reasonably reliable. More speculatively and with greater risks, we
also make predictions about things like the rate of continental drift which
are not just arm waving. But none of these sciences would fit MacIntyre's
model for a 'predictive science'. Yet many of the generalizations used here
are of the type characterized by MacIntyre for use in the social sciences.
They are not law-like generalizations with a precisely specifiable scope and
with generalizations sustaining counterfactuals. Yet we can and do use
them, together with observations, in the making of reliable predictions.
There is no reason why we should not call the sciences in which these
practices occur 'predictive sciences'. Yet, as MacIntyre in effect shows, in
the last part of Chapter 8 of After Virtue, we do the same thing in the
social sciences. So we should not deny that the social sciences are predict-
ive sciences.
Marx believes that he has made true generalizations about social development. He is, out, with his historical materialism, to give an account of epochal social change. History, as he sees it, is most fundamentally the growth of human productive power. Social formations rise and fall as they further or fetter that productive growth. Marx seeks, in terms of this conception, to periodize history. This involves generalizations about such things as the decline of feudalism, the rise and development of capitalism and its demise and it involves, as well, generalizations about the transition from capitalism to communism. These generalizations involve or generate, as we have seen, predictions and retrodictions. But they no more need commit us to 'strict predictions' invoking Hempelian laws than do predictions about continental drift or the effects of acid rain on Ontario lakes if emission levels remain what they are. Such 'non-strict predictions' can sometimes have a reasonable degree of reliability without strict Hempelian laws. And it is important to note in this context that the kinds of generalizations about epochal change that Marx was principally interested in are macro-claims and they are not at all in conflict with, or even inimicable to, the claims about the fragility and vulnerability of life that MacIntyre stresses. Moreover, they do not run afoul of the limitations of predictions of decisions, actions and inventions to which MacIntyre refers. The development of the productive forces requires the development of natural science or at least a portion of natural science. Indeed the productively relevant parts of science are themselves productive forces (Cohen 1978, 45-7). But while that is true it is also true that we have good reason to claim that we cannot predict exactly what future physics and the like will look like. But historical materialism does not require that. All that Marxists need here to be able to predict is (1) that, barring certain external contingencies, natural science will grow more complex and show a greater mastery over nature, (2) that scientific research, in class divided societies, will be in important ways subordinate to the needs of what are the dominant relations of production at any given time and (3) that in capitalism science will become increasingly subordinate to the needs of capital, including, of course, the developmental tendencies of the capitalist system. Marx makes period-relative generalizations that, without entailing precise predictions, make predictions which are open to confirmation and disconfirmation. Moreover, from the fact the the history of humankind as a whole is unique, it does not follow that there cannot be true generalizations of social development which are quite standardly empirically testable. From the fact that a process is unique it does not follow that we are restricted to a single observation as the ground for claims about generalizations concerning that process. A theory about the history of humankind as a whole could have, as an integral part, a number of predictions about the occurrence of events at various stages in that unique process that that theory purports to explain. The theory concerning that unique process could be tested by observations of the process at each of these various stages. As Richard Hulston has neatly put it: "The fact
that we are 'forever confined to the observation of one unique process' does not mean that we are forever confined to one unique observation" (Hudelson 1980, 264). Such a theory could be testable by 'distinct instances', instances in the sense of instances other than the one which prompted the construction of the theory.

A Marxist need not claim to be articulating laws in the strong Hempelian sense of laws, though he should be taken to be making trend statements of the following sort: if conditions of kind C obtain, then there will be a trend of kind Z. But such trend statements are even acceptable to such ascetic methodologists as Hempel or Popper. But Marx, even in talking about the tendency for accumulation, does not turn it into an absolute trend claim. Even that tendency has definite conditions and is falsifiable (Hudelson 1980, 265-7). The short of it is that there is no good reason to think Marx was committed to some metaphysical doctrine of historical inevitability or that he did not have in place a predictive social science. Only if we appeal to some excessively strong, in effect metaphysical, conception of 'predictive science', a conception that would have to deny that many predictions in activities that are unproblematically scientific and predictive are genuine predictions, would we be justified in denying that the social sciences are predictive sciences and that Marxism is a predictive science.

MacIntyre sets out to show that Marxism can't make predictions of the sort that it purports to make and that even if we allow for the sake of the argument that it could, we have rather conclusive grounds for believing those predictions to be false. He has failed in both of those tasks. We cannot set aside Marxism as a beguiling ideology in the way MacIntyre believes we can. It remains on the agenda.

How is the above to be related to his emotionally riveting final pages in After Virtue where he seeks to set aside a Marxism which once had his allegiance as a politically exhausted position with no moral centre of its own? (MacIntyre 1981a, 243-45)

Turning to Marxism after Marx, he sees, both in its theory and in its practice, moral failure. In its practice, MacIntyre would have it, its reference point, at its worst, is the phenomena of Stalinism, the Gulags and the like and, at its most benign, mere Weberian managerial manipulation in the service of state policy. More theoretically, he sees, parallel to the practice, a connected inadequacy (to put it minimally) in Marxism's failure to have a coherent moral vantage point that is not implicated in the incoherencies of liberal individualism. Marxists, he tells us, where they
have had to take explicit moral stances, "have always fallen back into relatively straightforward versions of Kantianism or utilitarianism" (MacIntyre 1981a, 243). And this he finds unsurprising, for he finds "secreted within Marxism from the outset ... a certain radical individualism" (243). His evidence for this is that, even if the productive forces will have sufficiently developed such that the springs of social wealth flow freely and people no longer live in class divided societies and no longer are crippled by a class ideology and will, by then, freely agree "to their common ownership of the means of production and to various norms of production and distribution", that still such people would have, within Marxian thought, been given no basis on which to enter into free association with others or to keep such a *gemeinwesen*. They have been given no grounds for this to remain one of their abiding loyalties. (Do we really need a basis here? We surely do not need a basis for everything. I hardly need a basis for my belief that pleasure is good and pain is bad. To think so is rationalism gone amuck.) Pressed here, to return to MacIntyre's line of reasoning, Marxists, subsequent to Marx, have, in a way which is actually ideological, fallen back on the morality of abstract principle in either a Kantian or utilitarian form, both of which MacIntyre thinks he has shown to be broken backed, intellectually indefensible stances caught up in the ideology of liberal individualism.

There are three responses that can, and indeed should, be made to MacIntyre here, only one of which I shall pursue in this essay. The two I shall not pursue are these: (1) The Enlightenment moral tradition is not as devoid of resources as MacIntyre would have us believe and Marxism, with a more adequate political sociology, taming and transforming liberalism's destructive individualism without destroying it, can, and indeed does, tap that tradition. (2) We can and should have morality without philosophical foundations or any other kind of foundations. Just as we can, and indeed do, have knowledge and perfectly adequate scientific and everyday practices without epistemological foundations, so we can have morality and perfectly adequate political practices without theological or philosophical moral foundations. It is a virtue in a philosopher to be a fallibilist and an anti-foundationalist (Levi 1981). What we need is a good, non-ideological understanding of our lives together and a few moral truisms which are available to us and concerning which there is a vast consensus. We no more need a Kant or a Sidgwick to give us a foundational moral theory than we need a Kant or Descartes to give us a foundational theory of knowledge. Philosophy, as traditionally conceived, drops out. (This is not to deny that something like John Dewey's form of moral inquiry remains.)

There is, however, a third response to MacIntyre which I do want to pursue a bit. It also has the advantage of being more concessive to his historicized Aristotelianism. To the extent that Marxists need any foundational moral account at all - something (2) above questions - there
is very good reason to think that the choice is not simply between some form of Kantianism or utilitarianism. One of the other alternatives is to see Marx's view of morality, where he is not exposing moral ideology, as in its underlying structure Aristotelian. Marx, we must remember, did not articulate a moral theory. (In my view he had far better things to do.) But many later marxists, but not only Marxists, who have tried to reconstruct a moral account from both Marx's scattered remarks about morality and from his underlying moral assumptions, have seen embedded in Marx a self-realizationist account which is essentially Aristotelian (Aronovitch 1980). In fact Marx's view of morality has been perspicuously characterized as structurally identical to Aristotle's but with a more adequate political sociology. Marx gives us, in fine, a moral view of the good for man that is, like MacIntyre's Aristotelian without Aristotle's metaphysical biology or class biases (Miller 1981). MacIntyre could very well see Marx as his precursor and not as his opponent. I, as I have argued elsewhere, am more skeptical of a virtue based ethics than is MacIntyre and would think it better to pursue the two alternatives characterized in the preceding paragraph (Nielsen 1984). But to the extent that we can give some non-ethnocentric and non-vacuous conception of the good for human beings in such a tradition, Marxism, with its carefully elaborated sociology, becomes an important developer here of the Aristotelian tradition. And this should be very much to MacIntyre's liking.

What about Marxist practice? MacIntyre thinks it is somehow inevitably flawed, at worst taking Gulag turns and at best Weberian. (He has remarked when "Marxists move towards power they always tend to become Weberians."[9]) Here I think MacIntyre is too taken with Trotsky's agonizing and searching questioning in the very last years of his life when he faced the question of whether the Soviet Union was in any sense a socialist country. If the reluctant and dismaying conclusion is that it isn't, this, MacIntyre believes, raises "implicitly the question of whether categories of Marxism could illuminate the future" (MacIntyre 1981a, 243).

It seems to me that there is a mistake here in the background assumptions and that it is indeed Marx who helps us to see it. Marx said that if we try to build socialism before we have a developed form of capitalism, we are going to find ourselves caught up again in capitalism's difficulties. And his historical materialism gives us a powerful explanatory account of why this is so. Rosa Luxemburg in the same vein recognized that when the revolution, starting in the periphery in Russia, did not spread to Central and Western Europe, that the revolution was doomed. The revolution might very well start in the periphery but to be successful, to make a transformation to a socialist society a reality, it must spread to the centre. Like many other ex-Marxists who think that Marxism has been historically disconfirmed, but who continue to share a roughly Marxist understanding of the inadequacy of liberalism and Welfare State Capitalism, MacIntyre
agonizes over this state of affairs and turns very pessimistic. While this is surely understandable, it is still vital to note that his belief that Marxism has been historically disconfirmed and his resultant pessimism is principally because of the Russian experience, though some similar remarks could be made about China as well. But both a study of Marx and a study of social reality should lead us to the realization that the expected test for Marxism has not yet come up before the bar of history. Capitalism is becoming an extensive corporate system with core and periphery. The test, on the perhaps overly optimistic assumption that we do not have a nuclear holocaust, is whether this centre/periphery arrangement of contemporary capitalism will remain stable or whether economic crises will come to touch in sufficient depth the slumbering proletariat of its centre as well as the newly created, non-slumbering proletariat of its periphery. The possibility of such a proletariat becoming radicalized still remains before us. The real test for socialism is what will happen if such a circumstance arises in the capitalist centre with its productive wealth and long standing traditions of parliamentary democracy. The failures of the Soviet Union or of China, if that is how they are to be described, are hardly surprising. They are exactly what Marx would have expected.

MacIntyre, in what might be taken as an attempted rebuttal of such remarks about his pessimism, asks, if the Marxist case for the moral impoverishment of capitalism is as good as it appears to be, how can Marxists expect a decent society of a socialist sort to arise from such a morally impoverished capitalist society? Where are the moral resources for the future to be derived from such a source? Marx speaks of a truly human society but how do we get it out of such a dehumanized capitalist society?

There are two logically independent observations I want to make in response. First, MacIntyre takes a too unnuanced view of liberalism and individualism. Not all is dross here: not everything in parliamentary democracy, not liberalism's ideal of tolerance, its commitment to civil liberties, its (at least in theory) respect for individuals, its secularism and critical attitude toward authority. That the 'dialectics of the Enlightenment' have brought it about that these are by now moral commonplaces does not make them any the less things that must be accepted, that must be a part of any good society. We must not forget that Marx was a radical democrat who, while seeking to give such liberal values economic foundations, i.e. to make them a reality in our lives, also extended them and in important ways went beyond them. Not everything in the capitalist order is morally impoverished. To believe that it is is a far too reilgious view. And Norway and Sweden are not South Africa and the United States. And even the United States is not South Africa.
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Secondly, while the mode of production that will replace the capitalist mode of production requires for its coming into being, at least in the centre, the productive advances, the capacity to create wealth, of late capitalism, it will be a socio-economic formation with a new rationale: production for need and not just for what, under the capitalist system, is capital accumulation. The achievement of certain stable levels of wealth make it feasible to produce for need and makes, even on grounds of marginal utility, Hobbesian postulates about human nature less necessary.

MacIntyre believes that this is Marxist optimism. It indeed is a happy scenario out of many possible scenarios some of which may be equally probable and some, I fear, rather more probable. We may very well blow ourselves out of existence or reduce ourselves to a genetically mucked up remnant of our former selves living in something like cluttered up stone age conditions. If I were a betting man I do not know where I would put my odds. I surely am not very confident about our survival. However, sensible Marxists will also be fallibilists and remind themselves of the dictum about the pessimism of the intellect and the optimism of the will. If there is not enough consolation here for those who have a religious or rationalist streak, remember that MacIntyre’s vision, which he curiously enough refuses to acknowledge as “a generalized social pessimism”, is far bleaker (MacIntyre 1981a, 244-5). It is not Marxism which needs to be set aside but the quest for certainty. We have learned to do without it in scientific domains. We need now to learn to do so in moral and political domains.

Notes
1 I exclude from consideration here his early fascinating Marxist essays and consider only his post-Marxist writings. For his Marxist writings see MacIntyre 1958/9, 1959 and 1960.
2 MacIntyre seems to have changed his mind here. The above remark applies to Marxist and Christianity written in 1953, but in his essay “Marx” written in 1964, he ascribes, what he calls in Marxism and Christianity “Engels’ position”, to the mature Marx as well.
4 This is part of the reason why some later Marxists have tried to cash out ‘ownership’ in terms of ‘effective power’. See Cohen 1978, ch. VIII.
5 I have criticized MacIntyre’s positive account in my 1984. See MacIntyre on Rorty in MacIntyre 1982 and in his 1983a.
6 This is carefully documented and powerfully argued in Harriet Friedman's 1982. For some remarks, possible rather ephemeral, concerning that 'capitalist centre' of the capitalist centre - the USA - see Michael Harrington 1984 and Richard Parker 1984.

7 Hook 1968. That there are resources here that McIntryre does not recognise is shown by J.B. Schneewind in Schneewind 1982 and 1983.

8 It has been one of the great virtues of Richard Rorty's work to drive this home for various non-moral knowledge claims. I have tried to start that task in the domain of the moral in my 1982a and in my 1982b.

9 This, incidentally, is the firm kind of generalization - a generalization sustaining predictions - that McIntryre in his methodological moments disallows. McIntryre 1981a, 243.

10 This is the sort of view that someone like Antony Flew might very well try to attribute to me.

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